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ABSTRACT 
The United States faces a domestic threat that is largely ignored by 
counterterrorism practitioners and policy: the Sovereign Citizens Movement. The 
adherents of this antigovernment movement have committed violent, even terroristic, acts 
and employed paper terrorism tactics. The group clogs courts and harasses government 
officials, but a paucity of hard data on the Sovereigns has stymied any concerted or 
unified response. Law enforcement officials have yet to determine how many Sovereigns 
are active in the United States, where they are concentrated, or whether the movement is 
gaining adherents. 
This thesis addresses the dearth of information on the Sovereign Citizens 
Movement. It relies on both quantitative and qualitative research, providing a detailed 
analysis of 548 court cases. The assessment of the group’s targets, related court 
vulnerabilities, and relevant statewide statistics can be harnessed into quality policy 
decisions. This work proves the increasing trend in Sovereign Citizen activities, exposes 
the gaps in the present literature and domestic terrorism policy, and provides 
recommendations for prescriptive policy changes across the spectrum of agencies 
responsible for countering domestic terrorist threats.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2010, James M. Tesi—now James-Michael: Tesi El of the Moorish 
National Republic—was pulled over in Arlington, Texas, during a routine traffic stop for 
not wearing his seat belt. This seemingly benign violation marked the first recorded 
encounter between the Sovereign Citizen James-Michael: Tesi El and law enforcement.  
In traffic court, Tesi asserted that the government is illegitimate and holds no 
jurisdiction over his life—typical Sovereign Citizen rhetoric—and refused to pay the fine 
for the seat belt citation. Later, in December 2010, Tesi was pulled over for speeding and 
subsequently arrested, as a warrant had been issued for the unpaid seat belt infraction 
fees. Further disputes by Tesi over his “sovereign freedom to travel” resulted in the 
issuance of yet another warrant by the Colleyville, Texas, courts.  
On Thursday, 7 July 2011, at 11:00 a.m., in a Colleyville, Texas, suburban 
neighborhood, Tesi was driving home when he was spotted by local police. The police 
officer attempted to pull over Tesi, a warrant apprehension for his failure to pay the 
traffic fines. Tesi pulled into his driveway and got out of his car. The officer also pulled 
up in front of Tesi’s home, exited his vehicle, and began walking toward Tesi, when he 
was met by the front sight of Tesi’s gun barrel and a hail of gunfire. The officer returned 
fire, wounding Tesi in the face and foot but escaping death and serious injury.1
  
The officer, a 26-year veteran of the force, might have adopted a different tactic 
when approaching Tesi had he known of Tesi’s Sovereign affiliation. What warning did 
the officer receive regarding the intent or history of James-Michael: Tesi El, and his past 
antigovernment activity? None at all.  
In a perhaps surprisingly similar vein, in April 2015, inmate Shawn Pass filed a 
petition with the U.S. District Court (USDC) of the Southern District of Ohio in an 
attempt to expunge his record and subsequently grant him freedom from incarceration. In 
                                                 
1 Robert Steinbeck, “Sovereign Citizen Shot in Exchange of Gunfire with Texas Cop,” Southern 




the case review, Justice Kemp quoted Pass’ petition and surmised that Pass sought to 
have “all of the records of this case be impeached, to be null and void, ab initio, with 
prejudice for lack of personam-jurisdiction, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and lack of 
standing.”2 Eight years before filing the petition, Pass had been convicted on three counts 
of criminal acts: conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, fraud, and money 
laundering. None of the previous counts involved Sovereign Citizen activity, yet after 
eight years of incarceration, Pass learned of a new tactic to pursue his clemency—appeal 
a sentence or marred record by attacking the jurisdiction of the court. Initiatives such as 
Pass’ have become a centerpiece tactic employed by those engulfed in the Sovereign 
Citizen ideology. Pass’ petition was denied, his sentence was not remanded, and no relief 
was given; however, the Department of Corrections spent costly hours reviewing and 
handling the inmate’s frivolous petition.3  
The USDC of the Southern District of Ohio spent valuable time and attention 
reviewing, contemplating, and then writing legal responses to deny Pass’ attempt at 
clemency. Instead of spending time on relevant cases, the various rungs of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), from the mail-handling clerks to multiple justices 
reviewing the Sovereign Citizen filings, are all now caught in a quagmire of recreational 
litigants of the Sovereign Citizen variety.  
Unfortunately, James-Michael: Tesi El’s violent police encounter is not unique. 
Shawn Pass’ frivolous petition is not isolated. Moreover, the collection of similar 
circumstances is not in decline. Instead, the rate of incidents is climbing.  
Over the past decade, the occurrence of Sovereign Citizen activity has surged, yet 
federal, state, and local agencies are not universally informed nor equipped to counter the 
threat.4 Present domestic terrorism policy focuses on applying the available tools and 
tactics for combatting foreign-born enemies on American soil, mostly radical Islamic 
terrorists, as evident by a review of the top most-wanted list of any federal agency. Of the 
                                                 
2 United States v. Pass, Appx. 832 413 Fed. (6th Cir. Ohio 2011). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Mark Potok, “The ‘Patriot’ Movement Explodes,” Southern Poverty Law Center, March 1, 2012, 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2012/patriot-movement-explodes. 
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14 names and faces that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) currently lists as most-
wanted domestic terrorists, only two are accused of activity within the 21st century, while 
the remaining 12 names are from cold war era incidents of communism, hijackings 
occurring during the 1980s, and central American plots.5
 
Based on my investigation of 
Sovereign Citizen appeals, as well as the available open source reporting, this thesis 
suggests that Sovereign-related incidents may number into the thousands.  
Sovereign Citizens have a real effect on American life. Police officers, court staff, 
and various other public officials are financially threatened and violently attacked at 
alarming rates. One study documents more than 140 cases of violent incidents in the past 
15 years related to antigovernment and Sovereign Citizen ideologies.6 In accordance with 
federal law, Title 18 U.S. Code § 233, the Sovereigns and Americans who subscribe to 
such violent ambitions qualify as domestic terrorists, not just criminals or fringe citizens, 
yet the necessary policy and actions to counter such a threat of terrorist plots simply has 
not entered the official conversations nor legislation.7 
I have proven, empirically that the Sovereign Citizen Movement has increased in 
frequency over the past ten years. Furthermore, I posit that conditions present in the U.S. 
political discourse have ripened the necessary antecedents for growing antigovernment 
movements. Such movements, whose followers have turned to violence and activity 
aimed at terrorizing a population, have earned the domestic terrorist moniker—and 
rightfully so. Still, current U.S. domestic terrorism and domestic intelligence policy do 
not provide the necessary focus to combat the non-Islamic American domestic terrorist. 
No organized government response exists to counter the systemic rise in incidents 
motivated by non-Islamic, domestic terrorists. Those responsible for addressing the issue 
assimilate their knowledge based on assumptions and observations, but the relevant 
                                                 
5 FBI, “Most Wanted Terrorists: Domestic Terrorism,” accessed February 29, 2016, 
https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/dt. 
6 JJ MacNab, “Anti-Government Extremist Violence and Plots,” JJMac, February 17, 2016, 
http://www.seditionists.com/antigovviolence.pdf.  
7 Legal Information Institute, “18 U.S. Code § 2331 - Definitions,” accessed July 12, 2016, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331. 
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literature, policy, and practices are not grounded in solid data. This thesis provides both a 
measure of solid data and a method of acquiring the long-needed insight. 
A. RISING TREND PROVEN 
One will not find, within the available literature, extensive research or reporting 
from any government entity on the matter. The DOJ has the only governmental 
foundation for research, beginning with the FBI encounters with antigovernment 
extremists of the 1990s. The FBI and the rest of the DOJ maintain small articles and a 
brief descriptive web page detailing the existence of the movement as well as detailed 
after action reports of major encounters such as the Waco, Texas, and Ruby Ridge, Idaho, 
incidents.8 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rescinded previous releases 
pertaining to Sovereigns due to political backlash, more on this in Chapter 4.9 
Civilian scholars and non-profit organizations have been toiling in the trenches 
and keeping records of Sovereign encounters. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) 
and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) have written on the topic, but only in a limited 
capacity, as they are both attempting to monitor groups espousing antigovernment, racist, 
and other domestic extremists.10  
Media reports on Sovereign Citizen actions are limited to the sensational. For 
example, Sovereign Citizen and Moorish follower Gavin Long made news in July 2016, 
albeit briefly, after engaging in a rampage shooting of Baton Rouge police officers, but 
the story fizzled after only a few short days, perhaps because Gavin Long was also black 
                                                 
8 FBI, “Domestic Terrorism: The Sovereign Citizen Movement,” April 13, 2010, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/april/sovereigncitizens_041310/domestic-terrorism-the-sovereign-
citizen-movement; Department of Justice, “Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, 
Texas February 28 to April 19, 1993” (Washington, DC.: U.S. Department of Justice, September 15, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/publications/waco/report-deputy-attorney-general-events-waco-texas-chronology-
february-28-april-19-1993. 
9 Daryl Johnson, Right Wing Resurgence: How a Domestic Terrorist Threat Is Being Ignored 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012). 
10 Southern Poverty Law Center, “SPLC Home Page,” accessed July 12, 2016, 
https://www.splcenter.org/. 
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and a U.S. Army veteran and did not fit into the terrorist mold the media expected.11 
Generally speaking, however, no regular reporting illuminates the Sovereigns, their 
numbers, or their tactics. 
Without a robust study into the sheer volume of Sovereign Citizen-related 
occurrences, federal, state, local, and tribal agencies countering domestic terrorism likely 
cannot mount a meaningful response—and Americans will remain at risk. This study 
mines and then reveals relevant data. By closing the gap in official studies, my intent is to 
influence policies that could increase the attention and resources necessary to counter the 
rising movement. No other such painstaking empirical analysis exists to date.  
Specifically, in this project, I examined 548 cases from all federal and state courts 
available within the Lexis database, to include all federal circuit courts, U.S. District 
Courts, State Court of Appeals, U.S. Tax Court, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims, and several unique State Appellate Courts, such as the Pennsylvania 
Common Wealth Court. Most cases were appeals, but some were actions initiated by 
Sovereigns against varying targets. Reaching back 10 years at the time of the data pull, 
which occurred on April 13, 2016, the results reflect a striking increase in Sovereign 
activity in the past decade. From 2008 through 2015, the number of Sovereign Citizen 
related cases faced by our nation’s courts has steadily increased. Since the data was 
pulled in April of 2016, Figure 1 below presents a nationwide statistical analysis, 
reflecting the total number of cases per year as depicted by the date on my search.  
                                                 





Chart reflects the total number of cases studied (548) and plots them along their 
respective 10-year span of the study. The dashed line indicates the trend line. 
Figure 1.   Sovereign Citizen Cases by Year, April 2006–April 2016 
The figure for 2016 only reflects the first 103 days of the year—and 43 cases had 
already been logged. The dashed line embedded in the chart reflects the trend line, which 
extends upward past 2016. If the movement remains unchecked, we can expect to see 
more incidents such as those recounted in the opening lines of this chapter. As Chapter II 
explains, the study was constrained by both time and database access; thus, these 
numbers likely are only the tip of the iceberg. 
During the research, it became necessary to track how many of the cases involved 
individuals who sought self-representation as well as those who sought fee waivers.12 
While benign at first, the self-representation and fee waiver status serve a tactical purpose 
                                                 
12 Legal Information Institute, “Rule 24. Proceeding in Forma Pauperis,” November 30, 2011, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frap/rule_24.  
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in their paper terrorism objectives. Moreover, the study was able to uncover that the body 
of characters has outgrown the traditional base of the movement’s white-male, Christian, 
Patriot-militia past. The consortium of characters now includes Black, Mexican, Moorish, 
Asian, as well as other ethnicities among their ranks. Because multiple demographics 
exist, the term Sovereign is used as an adjective throughout the research to describe 
general aspects of the movement.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Scholars, journalists, and government agencies have provided historical accounts 
and theoretical explanations of where Sovereign Citizens come from and why they 
engage in their antigovernment actions. In contrast, prescriptions for an organized 
response, provided mostly by scholars and journalists, do not provide the same level of 
definitive power. Most agree that the government should do more, but not what exactly. 
More cops? More policy? Perhaps what is necessary is balanced policy instead. The 
weakness in prior prescriptions owes primarily to the lack of understanding of the 
Sovereign Citizen movement as well as the political nature of the problem. Sovereigns 
live on the same political continuum as mainstream Americans. Their ideology and 
history are rooted in an American persona, not some radically different world view. 
Moreover, the documented histories of the movement are isolated to a time that no longer 
applies to our current political culture or counterterrorism worldview, yet the basic 
understandings of social movements persist.  
1. IDEOLOGY 
A short discussion on Sovereign Citizen ideology is necessary to frame the 
conversation. As the SLPC notes, Sovereigns truly believe that the current government is 
illegitimate, because, as they claim, at some point in the past 200 years the government 
transitioned from its original form to that of a corporation under admiralty law, which 
governs commerce not persons. Furthermore, due to the illegitimacy, once an individual 
declares himself or herself sovereign, he or she is no longer bound by the corrupt system. 
Thus, they believe that they do not have to follow the laws or guidelines restricting U.S. 
 8 
citizens.13 Some Sovereigns stop paying taxes, some refuse to register a vehicle or carry a 
driver’s license, others are willing to commit acts of revenge against officials who the 
Sovereign believes has infringed on their god given rights. Acts range from the violent to 
the harassing, but in all cases are aimed at intimidating and threatening a population 
through threat of violence and great personal loss.14  
As the lead agency for countering domestic terrorism within U.S. borders, the FBI 
has little more than a broad description of the movement: 
Sovereign citizens are anti-government extremists who believe that even 
though they physically reside in this country, they are separate or 
“sovereign” from the United States. As a result, they believe they don’t 
have to answer to any government authority, including courts, taxing 
entities, motor vehicle departments, or law enforcement. This causes all 
kinds of problems—and crimes. For example, many Sovereign Citizens 
don’t pay their taxes. They hold illegal courts that issue warrants for 
judges and police officers. They clog up the court system with frivolous 
lawsuits and liens against public officials to harass them. And they use 
fake money orders, personal checks, and the like at government agencies, 
banks, and businesses. That’s just the beginning. Not every action taken in 
the name of the Sovereign Citizen ideology is a crime, but the list of 
illegal actions committed by these groups, cells, and individuals is 
extensive (and puts them squarely on our radar). In addition to the above, 
Sovereign Citizens: commit murder and physical assault; threaten judges, 
law enforcement professionals, and government personnel; impersonate 
police officers and diplomats; use fake currency, passports, license plates, 
and driver’s licenses; and engineer various white-collar scams, including 
mortgage fraud and so-called “redemption” schemes.  
Sovereign citizens are often confused with extremists from the militia 
movement. But while Sovereign Citizens sometimes use or buy illegal 
weapons, guns are secondary to their anti-government, anti-tax beliefs. On 
the other hand, guns and paramilitary training are paramount to militia 
groups.15 
The last segment of the FBI’s Sovereign Citizen description gives reason for 
concern and demonstrates the lack of study in the field. A fixation on weapons does not 
                                                 
13 Southern Poverty Law Center, "Sovereign Citizens and Law Enforcement," YouTube video, 12:24. 
November 1, 2010. https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=d_y-gLm9Hrw. 
14 “Sovereign Citizens Movement,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed July 12, 2016, 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement. 
15 FBI, “Domestic Terrorism: The Sovereign Citizen Movement.” 
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make someone a terrorist or militia member, nor does the lack of a fixation on weapons 
prevent someone from becoming a terrorist. Moreover, as is discussed below, the tactics 
employed by Sovereign Citizens today were born from the militia movements. To claim 
that they are not related demonstrates a clear gap in research regarding the Sovereigns.  
In addition to the Patriot Militia Sovereign past, a parallel but different ideology 
employs the very same tactics against the very same targets, the Moorish Movement. The 
SPLC defines the Moorish Movement as: 
Increasing numbers of black Americans have melded [the Sovereign 
Citizen movement] with selective interpretations of the teachings of [the] 
Noble Drew Ali, who founded the exclusively black Moorish Science 
Temple of America (MSTA) almost 100 years ago… Noble Drew Ali 
taught that black “Moors” were America’s original inhabitants and are 
therefore entitled to self-governing, nation-within-a-nation status. Today, 
black nationalists who see themselves as Moors…believe they have key 
rights that pre-date by eons the present government…Central to their 
thesis is a rejection of the 14th Amendment, claiming it merely created a 
set of “artificial persons…Black, Negro, Coloreds and African-Americans 
are not living people; these ‘tags’ are politically and lawfully 
‘brands’…put upon the Aboriginal Indigenous Moors of Morocco.” They 
refer instead to actual treaties made between the United States and 
Morocco…in the late 18th century, which described a category of “Free 
Moor,” who could not be enslaved or subjected to U.S. law, even as other 
Africans were being packed into ships and sent to the New World as 
chattel.16 
A case in point is the April 2016 stand-off between the Citizens of the 
Constitution, led by Ammon Bundy, and the FBI at the Malhuer Wildlife Refuge in 
Oregon during a protest over what they believed to corrupt government practices and the 
wrongful sentencing of two Oregon ranchers.17 The Bundy family had a long history of 
resisting government “overreach,” such as his father’s 2014 Nevada protest and 
                                                 
16 Nelson, Leah, “‘Sovereigns’ in Black,” Southern Poverty Law Center, August 24, 2011, 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2011/%E2%80%98sovereigns%E2%80%99-
black. 
17 Beth Anne Steele, “Joint Statement by the FBI and Oregon State Police on Law Enforcement 




subsequent standoff with the Bureau of Land Management.18 Others involved in the 2016 
Oregon protest ranged from those seeking political activism over the issue at large, but 
many others, including heavily armed Sovereign Citizens and interstate militia groups, 
supported the antigovernment stand taken by the Citizens of the Constitution.19  
2. HISTORY 
Historical accounts unanimously direct researchers of Sovereign Citizens to the 
previous antigovernment Patriot and militia movements from the 1980s and 1990s. 
Journalist David Neiwert has written extensively on the connections of white supremacy 
and Christian Identity as well as a chronological account of significant militia events in 
the 1990s via first-hand interviews with militia leaders.20 Typical Patriot behavior during 
this period included stockpiling weapons and ammunition; generating funds through 
bogus liens, fake bonds, and fraudulent tax filings; as well as preparation for an inevitable 
standoff with the government. Patriots stand as the predecessors to the Sovereign Citizen 
movement.  
Dr. Lane Crothers tells the same story, but also begins to uncover the linkage 
between specific Patriots antigovernment beliefs and the Sovereign Citizen beliefs, where 
as “anything that these Sovereign Citizens decide is inappropriate is, ipso facto, wrong, 
unconstitutional, and corrupt—an assault on the fundamental values of the nation.”21 In 
2003, Crothers described Sovereigns as “white males whose forebears created the 
Constitution and who therefore enjoy special rights in the political system.”22 A 
                                                 
18 Ryan Lenz and Mark Potok, “War in the West: The Bundy Ranch Standoff and the American 
Radical Right,” Southern Poverty Law Center, July 9, 2014, https://www.splcenter.org/20140709/war-
west-bundy-ranch-standoff-and-american-radical-right. 
19 Kelly House, “Arrival of Rifle-Toting Patriots Breaks Relative Calm at Oregon Standoff 
Compound,” Oregon Live, January 10, 2016, http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2016/01/arrival_of_rifle-toting_patrio.html. 
20 David A. Neiwert, In God’s Country: The Patriot Movement and the Pacific Northwest 
(Washington: Washington State University Press, 1999); David A. Neiwert, The Eliminationists: How Hate 
Talk Radicalized the American Right (Sausalito, CA: PoiPointPress, LLC, 2009); David A. Neiwert, “Ash 
on the Sills: The Significance of the Patriot Movement in America,” Montana Law Review 58, no. 1 
Winter 1997 (January 1, 1997): 26. 
21 Lane Crothers, Rage on the Right: The American Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Homeland 
Security (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield, 2003). 60-61. 
22 Ibid. 72. 
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contemporary view of Sovereigns now counters Crothers’ description. Tactics born of 
white supremacy and Patriot or militia roots are now in use by not only the Moorish 
Movement, and Black Separatist groups,23 but also Latino groups24 as well as other 
demographics. 
Interestingly, many historical accounts follow a consistent theme that begins with 
a fuel source, a spark, an explosion, and the smoldering embers left behind—with the fire 
never entirely extinguished. Antigovernment sentiment, a perceived grievance, low-level 
incidents, major events, and the aftermath of legal encounters or violence accompany the 
pyrotechnic framework of the readings. Undercover civilian informants, such as Dale and 
Connie Jakes, reinforce the external observations with their firsthand reports during their 
infiltration of the Montana Freemen with the FBI in the 1990s.25 The couple had 
previously assisted law enforcement and had decided to assist the FBI after witnessing 
first had the antigovernment and criminal activity conducted by the Montana Freemen. 
During their undercover life, Dale narrates an encounter where a team of Freemen were 
producing fictitious financial documents and building a countrywide communications 
network in preparation for a final standoff. The financial tactics described during their 
encounter, include bogus tax liens, fake bonds and promissory notes, all of which are in 
the paper-terrorism arsenal of the Sovereign Citizen movement.26 
Literature regarding the Moorish Movement is even harder to find than that of the 
traditionally white Sovereign Citizen Movement. Though the Moorish Science Temple of 
America claims over 100 years of activity, the antigovernment targeting activity has only 
spiked in recent decades. The Moorish variety of Sovereign Citizens has begun to refine 
                                                 
23 Nelson, Leah, “Sovereigns in Black.” 
24 Department of Justice, “Final Defendants in Quarter Billion Dollar ‘Old Quest’ Tax Refund Scam 
Plead Guilty to Defrauding Internal Revenue Service with Recent Pleas, 53 Linked to Massive Scheme 
Have Been Convicted,” September 8, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/final-defendants-quarter-
billion-dollar-old-quest-tax-refund-scam-plead-guilty. 
25 Dale Jakes, Connie Jakes, and Clint Richmond, False Prophets: The Firsthand Account of a 
Husband-Wife Team Working for the FBI and Living in Deepest Cover with the Montana Freemen. 




their ideology, beginning with a loose following of the Moorish Nation in 199827 to the 
well-defined movement of today under the teachings of the MTSA.28 
Comingling of incidents committed by the Sovereigns of the Patriot Militias past, 
the newer Moorish Movements, as well as simple criminals preying on susceptible 
recruits of these groups, creates a difficult task of separating one from the others. 
Sovereigns of all brands, Militias, as well as criminals have been known to use the same 
paper-terrorism tactics against government officials and civilians. Thus, an anti-
government theme weaves them together into a potentially larger consortium with 
possibly larger possibilities of grander mobilizations in the near future. Few studies deal 
systematically with paper-terrorism or any of the less spectacular—but arguably more 
effective—Sovereign tactics. 
3. CURRENT DISCUSSION 
Two open-source repositories for information on Sovereign actions are available: 
special reports by government and nongovernment organizations and the news media. 
Until this thesis, nobody from the federal or state level has conducted a quantitative 
study. Government reports provide remarkably similar information, but are also similarly 
deficient as to the sheer volume of incidents. Government reports all warn of a rise in 
activity, yet they only focus on the most violent offenses and offer only a handful of 
cases, which appear to reference only each other. When the government reports are 
compared to nongovernment organizations, such as the ADL and the SPLC, the federal 
reports reflect significant gaps in accurate incident tracking. The ADL’s report provides 
approximately 80 examples of Sovereign actions over the past five years, which is the 
only resource that attempts to demonstrate how frequent and wide spread the Sovereign 
epidemic has become.29  
                                                 
27 Southern Poverty Law Center, “Common Law Bruises Big Apple,” March 15, 1998, 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/1998/common-law-bruises-big-apple. 
28 Nelson, Leah, “Sovereigns in Black.” 
29 Anti-Defamation League, “The Lawless Ones: Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement” 
(New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2012). 
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In June 2015, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response 
to Terrorism (START) delivered a report on Financial Crimes Perpetrated by Far-Right 
Extremists in the United States from 1990–2013. Therein, 609 financial schemes are 
tallied amounting to over one billion dollars in government losses. Sovereign Citizens 
were discovered to have been behind 40 percent of the cases, which nearly doubles the 
second place offender, tax protestors.30 Of the activities researched by START, tax 
avoidance rated highest at 59 percent of all cases, with the remainder of the offenses 
ranging from false liens and documents, check fraud, banking fraud, investment fraud, 
and other schemes.31 One particular case involving fraudulent schemes caused 400 
homeowners, almost exclusively Spanish speaking, to pay the subject, a Sovereign 
Citizen proponent, $15,000 to relieve them of their mortgages by means of a special 
Sovereign Citizen paperwork filing scheme against the homeowners creditors.32 
JJ MacNab, a fellow at George Washington University, Center for Cyber and 
Homeland Security, has studied and published on Sovereigns extensively, including a 
seven-page table accounting for violent Sovereign-related incidents and plots beginning 
in March 2000 and ending with the recent Oregon standoff in February 2016. MacNab’s 
report reflects, empirically, that more than 140 violent antigovernment incidents, 
involving Sovereigns and Militias, have occurred during the past 15 years.33 Urban bias 
is another factor to consider perpetrated by the national news media. Many authors, 
Crothers included, noted how various news outlets and satirical shows only depict 
Sovereigns and Patriots as cowboys or right-wing crazies, thereby negating any chance of 
their voice being taken seriously.34  
30 Financial Crimes Perpetrated by Far-Right Extremists in the United States: 1990 – 2013,
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=767536  
31 Ibid.
32 Department of Justice. "Whittier Woman Sentenced to Nearly 6 Years in Prison for Having Duped
400 Victim Homeowners – Many Spanish Speakers – of Nearly $4 Million with False Promises of 
Eliminating Their Mortgages.” October 5, 2015.http://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/whittier-woman-
sentenced-nearly-6-years-prison-having-duped-400-victim-homeowners-many 
33 MacNab, “Violence and Plots.”
34 Stephen Colbert, "The Oregon Militia Needs More Stuff," CBS. YouTube video, 3:47, posted by
The Late Show with Stephen Colbert on January 13, 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=56&v=izP3RnrNJx4. 
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4. SOVEREIGN VOICE 
There is more to Sovereign organization—and a Sovereign canon—than many 
experts acknowledge. Various guides are available through any number of the 
underground websites—for example, the Sovereign Education and Defense Ministry, 
sedm.org, or at Freedom-School.com. Often these websites reference each other and 
provide links to various documents or products such as anonymously authored documents 
detailing the Sovereign’s claim of a straw man created by the U.S. government to pledge 
humans as collateral in a global credit scheme.35 A simple query into any major online 
search engine with the key words “meet your strawman” one will uncover an 
insurmountable number of videos and links to the Sovereign web presence. Many of the 
sites, however, are littered with viruses and other malware that could compromise one’s 
system, so be fair warned. Sovereign guides such as the Court Survival Guide, which also 
references Vehicle Survival Kits, and a Citation Refusal Kit are readily available through 
many of the different websites, yet the guides are identical, one could dare say 
standardized.36 Moreover, training slides are available for all. The average American 
citizen and prospective adherent has a plethora of sources. Some presentations are 
specifically targeted at police officers in an attempt to educate the law enforcement 
community; attempting to wrangle their opposition forces for recruitment.37 Lastly, all of 
the reporting listed above by government agencies and non-profit entities discuss the 
problem in the United States, but the notion of individual sovereignty lives beyond the 
U.S. border. The Sovereign Citizen Movement is international.38 
Sovereigns have their own press, sovereignty-press.net, which produces various 
titles, one of which speaks to readers with simple terms complete with illustrations, Title 
4 Flag Says You’re Schwag: The Sovereign Citizen’s Handbook Version 3.2, which is 
                                                 
35 Freedom School, “Your Strawman Is an Artificial Person,” Freedom School, 2016, http://freedom-
school.com/aware/your-straw-man-is-an-artificial-person.html. 
36 Freedom School, “Court Survival Guide,” Freedom School, n.d., http://freedom-
school.com/law/court-survival-guide.pdf. 
37 Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, “Sovereignty for Police Officers Form #12.022,” 
March 29, 2013, http://sedm.org/LibertyU/SovereigntyForPolice.pdf. 
38 "Strawman - The Nature of the Cage (OFFICIAL)," YouTube video, 2:06:27, posted by The Nature 
of the Cage, July 30, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sArXw6ajNg. 
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readily available for purchase through Amazon.com or other online book sales.39 
Moreover, pamphlets and pocket-sized cut-outs ready for laminating, such as quick 
reaction cards for use during police encounters, are readily available for purchase.40 
Audio recordings, live streaming shows, and podcasts are also in abundant supply.41 
Shock Jock shows, such as the Pete Santilli Show on the Guerilla Media 
Network42 and Info Wars on the Alex Jones YouTube channel,43 offer the Sovereigns a 
political stage and voice that resembles the more traditionally accepted, center-right, live 
news political media coverage. Jones supports Sovereign Citizens’ actions during his 
shows with statements attacking the government’s position: “Our sovereignty is ending, 
the Feds run everything from what our kids eat, to the price of our power…we are 
conquered…and it’s a normal response to get physically ill, and angry, and enraged by all 
of this.” Santilli provided live updates during the Malheur Refuge, Oregon, Standoff of 
February 2016. Prior to his arrival in Oregon, he read Sovereign documents and 
declarations regarding common law and jurisdiction over the situation and then provided 
a warning for listeners to “be very, very cautious how you navigate through this 
admiralty law thing, but the treasure, the golden treasure in the treasure chest is the truth 
about admiralty law and how they have literally enslaved us through language.”44  
                                                 
39 J. M. Sovereign Godsent, Title 4 Flag Says You’re Schwag: The Sovereign Citizen’s Handbook 
Version 3.2, vol. 3 (Sovereignty Press, 2012). 
40 J. M. Sovereign Godsent, Sovereign Citizen’s Cut-Out Kit 1.0: Cut the Government Out of Your Life 
Forever (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012). 
41 Simon Black, “055: What It Means to Be Sovereign,” Sovereign Man, November 10, 2015, 
https://www.sovereignman.com/podcast/what-it-means-to-be-sovereign-18214/ 
42 Pete Santilli, "Guerilla Media Network - The Pete Santilli Show," YouTube video, 1:58, posted by 
Pete Santilli Show on December 9, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=118&v=eH-
2NyVAZ3Y&ebc=ANyPxKpOk5CyvG2mAOfXHZdSp3cGYSQjubo82WLu5EwxIMT2g56DBNIJEaXsz
xb_15XxgiwcrWBLmizJGRH_Nux4Gyoc-9sR4Q; Alex Jones, "InfoWars Live On the Scene In Oregon," 
InfoWars. YouTube video, 19:00. January 4, 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJdgnKqTSAg&list=PLKkSfhYk-
XBjULo5tq3l3ZzlvhLLHo6Mg&index=26. 
43 Alex Jones, InfoWars Live On the Scene in Oregon.  
44 Pete Santilli, "Hammond Ranch Update: Open Letter to Sheriff David Ward & All Sheriffs in The 
United States," YouTube video, 26:27. posted by Pete Santilli Show on December 1, 2015.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3JqIceKh6I. 
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Neiwert describes such media as the types of shows that “have provided the 
antenna for transmission of the antigovernment sentiment into the radio receivers across 
the country.”45 Subscriptions to podcasts such as Sovereign Man, offer a seemingly sane, 
rational plan that not only explains the problems with the government in plain language, 
but also offer solutions that stir a sense of action in the minds of the listeners; simple 
tasks at first, such as voting with your feet to move to less restrictive states or how to 
become an expat.46 But when some are faced with the hurdles of officially renouncing 
one’s U.S. citizenship, such as exit taxes or learning a new language, individuals with 
Sovereign beliefs may decide to forego official renouncement and instead opt for a 
cheaper albeit illegal path to achieve their goals. 
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter accounts provide a stable platform for 
information sharing, but more importantly, the social media framework provides for real-
time communication across the entire nation.47 As the Oregon standoff made clear, 
occupiers issued a call to action across all three networks and other various websites for 
members to drive to the Malheur Wildlife Refuge to provide arsenal, manpower, and 
supplies.48 The call was answered with an immediate armed response from various 
Sovereigns and Patriot Militia type organizations and members to include the Idaho 
Three Percenters and the Pacific Patriots Network, demonstrating the efficacy of the 
communication media.49 Networked organization, however, is not new to this 
demographic. Dale and Connie Jakes, the civilian informants discussed earlier, tell the 
tale of how the Montana Freemen had created a nationwide telephone network during the 
late 1990s and had multiple states across the country ready and willing to descend upon 
                                                 
45 Neiwert, Eliminationists: Hate Talk. 
46 Simon Black, “060: Open Your High-Risk Savings Account Today!,” Sovereign Man, February 19, 
2016, https://www.sovereignman.com/podcast/high-risk-savings-18696/. 
47 Ammon Bundy, “**This Is a Call to Action**,” Social Media, Facebook, (December 30, 2015), 
https://www.facebook.com/bundyranch/posts/936776653065810. 
48Ammon Bundy, "Breaking Alert All Call to Militias! Bundy Ranch! Breaking Alert All Call to 
Militias! Bundy Ranch!" YouTube video, 10:44, posted by Blaine Cooper on December 29, 2015., 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=65&v=ttnT4rQUbPc. 
49 House, “Arrival of Rifle-Toting Patriots Breaks Relative Calm at Oregon Standoff Compound.” 
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the small ranch near the Justus Township to defend the ground against the corrupt 
illegitimate government..50 
5. LEADERSHIP 
The FBI and DHS, as well as the SPLC and ADL, all describe the Sovereign 
Citizen Movement as “a loose network of individuals living in the United States.”51 This 
perception contributes to the negligible attention paid to the Sovereigns as a security 
problem. Some scholars require that a movement be motivated by a unifying leader to 
possess the necessary pieces for growth. Possessing and subsequently losing a major 
figure head, as Crothers notes, aided in the decline of the Patriot Militias in the late 1990s 
after many of the hard core cadre left the movement following the 1995 Oklahoma City 
Bombing.52  
Moreover, the notion of the Sovereign Citizen Movement as a leaderless, 
amorphous group may be a misperception. In research conducted by Molly Mee, Seattle 
University, Sovereign Citizen groups can possess extraordinarily standard organizational 
structures, much like that of a small nonprofit organization with positions such as the 
president, vice president, treasurer, secretary, and unique positions of authority such as 
justices, constables, and rangers.53 Moreover, if the sovereignty press publishes 
handbooks and manuals,54 if individuals are providing seminars and training programs,55 
and if websites are peddling frivolous UCC redemption procedures,56 then how can our 
counterterrorism experts claim that the Sovereigns are loosely affiliated or leaderless?  
                                                 
50 Jakes, Jakes, and Richmond, False Prophets. 
51 “Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement,” FBI, accessed July 14, 
2016, https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/sovereign-citizens-a-growing-domestic-threat-to-law-
enforcement. 
52 Crothers, Rage on the Right. 
53 Molly Mee, “The Anatomy of a Sovereign Citizen Group: Creating a Target Model” (Master’s 
Thesis, Seattle University, 2013). 
54 Godsent, Title 4 Flag Says You’re Schwag. 
55 "New York Republic - Interim Republic President James Timothy Turner- Vice President Charles 
Wright," YouTube video, 3:15, posted by New York Republic on January 5, 2011. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4bOlUwHvD8. 
56 Legalucc.com, “Legal UCC Homepage,” Legal UCC, 2013, http://www.legalucc.com/index.html. 
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C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Granted the Sovereign fixation on the court system, this thesis relies on legal 
documents to establish the breadth and depth of the Sovereign movement. Using the 
Lexis database, I searched through the last 10 years of cases involving Sovereign 
Citizens, yielding 548 cases. I read every one of these cases—3,565 pages of legal 
review—extracting 12 data points from each to create a database of information for 
analysis. Chapter II explains the methods of this research.  
By going deeper, the study pinpoints, empirically, multiple data points that allow 
for qualitative analysis, and Chapter III lays out some of these considerations, including 
the range of Sovereign Citizen actions (Chapter III is devoted to the output of the data); 
the preferred target or fixation of their grievances; differentiation between those who 
became Sovereign Citizens after incarceration and those who were Sovereign prior to a 
police encounter; outcomes of cases attempting Sovereign defenses; and lastly a 
quantitative study of cases per state, year, and court. During the research, it became 
necessary to track how many of the cases involved individuals who sought self-
representation as well as those who sought fee waivers, or in forma pauperis status, 
which is essentially permission to proceed without paying any fees.57 While benign at 
first, the self-representation, or pro se, and in forma pauperis status serve a tactical 
purpose in their paper terrorism objectives. Moreover, the study was able to uncover that 
the body of characters has outgrown the traditional base of the movement’s white-male, 
Christian, Patriot-militia past. The consortium of characters now includes Black, 
Mexican, Moorish, Asian, as well as others. Because multiple demographics exist, the 
term Sovereign is used as an adjective throughout the research to describe general aspects 
of the movement. Further analysis is possible through the use of the data collected herein. 
Furthermore, this study is repeatable and well within skillset of domestic intelligence 
analysts, from the local police department’s intelligence office all the way up the Director 
of National Intelligence. Studies such as this need to become part of the regular discourse 
of domestic terrorism, intelligence, and homegrown violent extremism. 
                                                 
57 Legal Information Institute, “28 U.S. Code § 1915 - Proceedings in Forma Pauperis,” accessed July 
16, 2016, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1915. 
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Chapter IV addresses the potential explanations for the growth of the Sovereign 
Citizen movement. Sovereign Citizens’ albeit twisted view of morally right and wrong 
lies on the same plane of the American political continuum. Sovereigns grew up in the 
same neighborhoods, went to the same schools, and believe in the same overarching 
principles as mainstream Americans. Social movement theory as well as other theories on 
social movements can help to understand why Sovereign actions are increasing.  
Although this work has been mainly expositional, uncovering the empirically 
proven rise in Sovereign Citizen activity, it also holds some promise about how the data 
could be used or how the method could be repeated to provide prescriptive actions aimed 
at addressing the issue. Chapter V concludes the work with some prescriptions for court 
procedures to decrease the amount of time spent on frivolous paper terrorism, for the 
DOJ response to protecting law enforcement officers during Sovereign Citizen 
encounters, and recommended updates to legislation to rebalance the focus of U.S. 
domestic counterterrorism efforts. 
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II. METHODS 
Throughout the research process of this thesis, I found no quantitative study of the 
Sovereign Citizens. I had expected to find analysis based on historical record keeping or 
a database tracking Sovereign Citizen encounters. Unfortunately, no such collection of 
information existed beyond the seminal but partial ADL article, Lawless Ones,58 and JJ 
MacNab’s research on antigovernment plots.59 
My intent for the research was to compile a repository of firm data from 
legitimate and reputable sources. In this chapter, I will explain my search design, as well 
as the limits of this study and of my approach to this project, the controls used to focus 
the data collection and how the various products developed were refined. Ultimately, the 
chapter recounts my journey through the material and the method in hopes that future 
research can improve upon or leverage the methods used to further the understanding of 
Sovereign Citizens and other emerging threats our nation may face. 
A. SEARCH DESIGN 
When looking for empirical data to search for numbers of case studies involving 
Sovereign Citizens, I reasoned that each time Sovereigns had a police encounter, had 
been sentenced in a court of law, or had any other interaction with the DOJ, I could 
expect to find copies of the case law reviews, dockets, or other public records. Of the 
available research tools afforded to graduate students at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
the Lexis Research System offered a database of cases, which I could search for 
Sovereign Citizen-related cases.60 
Initial research began with key-word searches within the Case Law search 
engines. The search engine allowed me to look for names, key words, particular laws, and 
                                                 
58 Anti-Defamation League, “Lawless Ones.” 
59 MacNab, “Violence and Plots.” 





many other factors. Additionally, the tool allowed me to filter out results based on federal 
and state level, particular states, as well as special courts, such as the U.S. Tax Court, in 
addition to circuit courts and the numerous state-level District Courts of Appeals.  
Searching for cases related to Sovereigns initially yielded thousands of results due 
to the vague nature of the search results. Everything from naturalization cases to cases 
involving diplomats with sovereign immunities were included in the data. Thus, 
refinement was necessary.  
The final search parameters shaped up more narrowly. First, I selected all federal 
and state cases. In doing so, I ensured to cover the broadest swath of regions, districts, 
and specialized courts, such as the U.S. Tax and Bankruptcy Courts. Next, I pursued 
cases back ten years, a sufficiently narrow search window for the completion of a thesis, 
yet time enough to yield quantitative value for the research.  
Finally, I settled on one search term: “Sovereign w/1 Citizen.” Special characters 
change the search results within Lexis as they do in many search engines. Quotation 
marks ensure to look for the specific word or phrase and the special characters “w/1” 
ensure that results have the words sovereign and citizen within one word of each other. 
Without such special signifiers in the search parameters, numerous results would appear 
with the terms sovereign discussing the status of a foreign embassy’s rights and then the 
word citizen hundreds of times throughout another case. In the end, the final search 
parameters included federal and state cases, within the last ten years as of April 2016, 
with the search terms “Sovereign w/1 Citizen” placed in the search engine.  
The result was 548 cases.  
I filtered the results to reflect only the pages necessary to gather the information 
necessary. In total, 3,565 pages were the result of the 548 filtered cases. The search 
automatically numbered the results chronologically and by court type. For example, the 
Circuit Courts were listed first, followed by the U.S. District Courts, then Tax Courts, 
and so forth. The cases were numbered 1 through 548, a system that I used throughout 
my research and also within the database for quick reference. The cases were saved into 
three separate electronic documents due to the massive size of the data. Cases 1 through 
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200 were saved to the first document, 201 through 400 to the second, and 401 through 
548 on the last. The entire database and Lexis search results are saved and available for 
future use by the Dudley Knox Library; details of the saved location are contained within 
Appendix B. 
B. LIMITING FACTORS 
Although this study is robust, it is only the tip of the iceberg of empirical research 
necessary to complete the picture of Sovereigns in the United States. On the version of 
Lexis to which I had access, records from Circuit Courts, state-level U.S. District Court 
of Appeals, State Court of Appeals, and special courts, such as Tax Courts are available, 
but not county courts, and other lower level courts. Thus, the only cases available for 
research involve those subjects that had been tried and convicted and then filed petitions, 
motions, or other appellate filings for consideration by higher courts, or cases that 
requested that a higher level court hear a complaint against a lower level court. 
Undoubtedly, a similar nationwide search of the lower courts and traffic courts, as well as 
such other databases as the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) could produce 
many, many more cases. I would be interested to learn whether the broad trends that my 
research revealed hold true across these numbers of cases. 
Human error can play a role in any large-n study. Without technological aids for 
compiling and coding the data, this study relied on the eyes, skill, time, tradecraft, as well 
as a plethora of other human factors that contribute to the successful extraction of the 
information from each case. A research journey through 548 cases and 3,565 pages 
looking for key points, names, professions, intentions, and trends is vulnerable to 
subjective discretion and missed data on the part of the researcher. Each case varied in 
length, some a mere five pages while others were 40 or more. I set out to complete 50 
case reviews per week during my fourth quarter. Thus, I had charted a course to complete 
essentially an eleven-week deep dive into the nuances of each of the Sovereign Citizen 
cases. 
It is also worth noting that the offenses and incidents committed by the Sovereign 
Citizen, which initiated the encounter with law enforcement officials, did not necessarily 
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occur the same year as the case query. For example, one Sovereign, John Cobin, sought 
retaliation against the commissioner of the IRS in regard to collection of 1991 and 1992 
tax bills, which he refused to pay as he claimed “his sovereign status made his body real 
property, gave him the ability to opt out of paying Federal taxes by revoking an election 
he had purportedly made under section 871(d), and allowed him to keep all of the income 
his labor generated.”61 In 2003, the IRS initiated the collection action for the 1991 and 
1992 tax liabilities, and the case was then entangled for six years as the IRS and the 
courts sparred with Cobin’s pseudo-legal tactics until finally the U.S. Tax Court ruled in 
favor of the IRS and imposed further fines against Cobin for the delayed proceedings.62  
C. CONTROLS 
Coding became the next challenge. It was necessary to review each case to 
determine what data would be necessary to create the kind of quantitative and qualitative 
information desired. Several days were spent working with research specialists and the 
Dudley Knox Library staff to determine if the means existed to data mine specific 
information from the cases with Lexis. The team attempted multiple filters and methods 
of searching, but nothing reliably workable presented itself at the time. Therefore, it was 
necessary to comb through all 3,565 pages myself, painstakingly, to uncover the data.  
Upon conclusion of the review, I determined that 530 of the 548 cases involved 
adherents to the Sovereign Citizen movement. Cases not related to Sovereign Citizens 
totaled at 18 and had the search terms close together for another reason—for example, in 
cases involving Native American disputes or foreign diplomat affairs. Some of the non-
applicable cases involved filings that did not feature the Sovereign rhetoric; rather, the 
decision had notes and references from previous case law involving Sovereign Citizens 
tactics. Therefore, the final search parameters discussed above were effective containing 
a 97 percent success rate of yielding search results for Sovereign Citizens—at the appeal 
level, at least. 
                                                 
61 Cobin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2009–88 (T.C. 2009). 
62 Ibid. 
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Initial coding efforts were ambitious, looking to extract specific demographics, 
such as age, gender, and ethnicities, but it was soon apparent that such information was 
not readily available in all case notes. The study would need narrowing and the focus 
honed. With the help of my thesis advisors, I settled on 12 factors to extract from each 
case: general information, such as case title; case or docket number; presiding court, year, 
state; detailed information, such as pro se or in forma pauperis status; ruling or outcome; 
case dismissal with or without prejudice; circumstances of the offense; target or victim of 
the offense; whether the Sovereign adherent became sovereign prior to or after a DOJ 
encounter or both; and lastly, any special notes that seemed relevant for further 
discussion. Each of the criteria are explained in detail. 
General information was gathered for the full ten-year time span to create Large-
N quantitative research. Tracking of the case titles and case numbers did not provide any 
relevant data for study, but was necessary in order to keep the cases organized and 
available for reference if needed. Gathering information on which court presided over the 
cases allows the DOJ to look for the courts or districts having the most experience with 
Sovereigns, which could lead to discovering best practices. 
Some specific information became apparent as the case reviews ensued, however. 
Once I had become accustomed to the layout of each Lexis case review, I went back and 
started over with additional criteria on the scope. The qualitative analysis involved a 
deeper examination into cases spanning the past five years. Some 440 of the 548 cases 
reviewed occurred within the last five years of this study. Detailed information that 
would be of interest to most law enforcement agencies included the. I identified key data 
points that would enable law enforcement agencies and researchers to leverage my 
efforts. My analysis considered the outcomes of the case, circumstances of the offenses, 
as well as the intended targets or victims. In all 12 criteria were identified as key points of 
interest. 
Case outcomes became an interest item when I began to notice the striking 
number of cases that were dismissed, nearly all in favor of the Sovereign’s opponent 
(typically the government), but that most were not dismissed with prejudice or without 
leave to amend. The distinction between dismissing a case with or without prejudice is 
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significant, particularly granted the Sovereign penchant for paper-terrorism as a tactic of 
choice. By simply dismissing a case, without prejudice, the court allows the individual to 
resubmit the same action if it is amended in some way—often many times until the filing 
is legally adequate. If the case is dismissed with prejudice, things change. As the Legal 
Information Institute explains, when a court dismisses a case with prejudice, “the court is 
saying that it has made a final determination on the merits of the case, and that the 
plaintiff is therefore forbidden from filing another lawsuit based on the same grounds.”63 
Dismissal with prejudice typically follows a determination that the case is frivolous in the 
legal sense. Chow, a consulting attorney, provides a working definition that is in line with 
Rule 11b governing the submissions of legal proceedings, “a frivolous lawsuit is one that 
asserts a legal claim that has no legal merit whatsoever… Such lawsuits are commonly 
used to harass or intimidate the target of the suit.”64 After the court dismisses an action 
with prejudice, it can then take measures to dismiss future filings of the same matter 
quickly—and to impose sanctions under Rule 11 of Federal Civil Procedures against the 
recreational litigants attempting to file yet another frivolous claim.65 The rate of cases 
dismissed with prejudice was strikingly low nationwide—only 14 percent of Sovereign 
cases in this study were deemed by courts to be completely over. 
Another item of interest was the remarkable consistency with how often 
Sovereign adherents would seek pro se status, or more simply put, self-representation.66 
During case reviews, I had learned through numerous justices’ case notes of what self-
representation means in terms of courtroom procedures. When a defendant or plaintiff 
proceeds in pro se status, or self-representation, it requires the court and judge to give 
individuals more latitude in their filings. An allowance as such, opens the door for 
Sovereign Citizens to drop massive incomprehensible documents, sometimes well more 
than 100 pages in length, which the courts must review prior to making any 
                                                 
63 Legal Information Institute, “Dismissal with Prejudice,” August 19, 2010, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dismissal_with_prejudice. 
64 Andrew Chow, “What Is a Frivolous Lawsuit?,” Find Law, October 23, 2012, 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/injured/2012/10/what-is-a-frivolous-lawsuit.html. 
65 Legal Information Institute, “Rule 11,” November 30, 2011, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_11. 
66 Legal Information Institute, “Pro Se,” August 6, 2007, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/pro_se. 
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determination. In accordance with case law established in the 2006 case Boxer X v. 
Harris, “pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by 
attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”67 Thanks to this requirement, judges 
and attorneys must now sift through the nonsensical, legalese arguments, costing the 
courts precious time and resources. This burden is, of course, the goal of the Sovereign 
litigant. Thus, tracking the rate at which the Sovereign citizens selected to seek self-
representation speaks to both their distrust for a “corrupt” legal system as well as their 
paper-terrorism tactic of deliberately clogging courts.  
Courts, however, are not without recourse for such tactics. Case law has given the 
courts tools to combat the outlandish filings that simply ramble on without ever stating a 
claim. In Brock v. Carroll, the court established that “federal court does not act as an 
advocate for a self-represented litigant.”68 Moreover, in Beaudett v. City of Hampton, the 
court also established that “a court is not obliged to ferret through a complaint, searching 
for viable claims. District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely 
presented to them.”69 As Chapter III points out, however, courts availed themselves of 
this way out of the Sovereign pro se trap less often than they could have. 
Related to the pro se issue, is the effort of many Sovereigns to seek in forma 
pauperis (IFP) status for their pleadings. In forma pauperis means “in the form of a 
pauper” and designates an individual too impoverished to afford the filing fees and other 
associated legal costs incurred through regular court proceedings.70 Within the United 
States, proper legal action is not a privilege granted only to those who can afford such 
niceties; IFP proceedings reflect the courts’ resolve to ensure everyone has access to their 
Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial, regardless of income inequality.71  
                                                 
67 Linge v. State of Georgia Inc., Appx. 895 569 Fed. (11th Cir. Ga. 2014). 
68 Drelijah J. Muhammad v. SSA Ins. Corp., LEXIS 836 2016 U.S. Dist. (D. Md. 2016). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Legal Information Institute, “Proceedings in Forma Pauperis,” accessed July 16, 2016, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1915. 
71 Legal Information Institute, “Sixth Amendment,” February 5, 2010, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/sixth_amendment. 
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In some courts—Georgia, for example—the in forma pauperis status also 
followed a peculiar rule that was established in Dupree v. Palmer, which states, “when 
the district court denies a prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to § 
1915(g), the proper procedure is for the court to then dismiss the complaint without 
prejudice.”72 Thus, as a tactic, if IFP is denied, the Sovereign is nearly guaranteed that 
the case will not be dismissed with prejudice. This means that the individual can then 
resubmit the same action again, and again; and the typical Sovereign litigant will do so. 
The rule seems to favor the recreational litigant—that is, the Sovereign 
The data also allowed me to differentiate between the cases that involved 
individuals who were followers of the Sovereign Citizen ideology prior to the police 
encounter and the individuals who became Sovereign adherents while incarcerated. The 
purpose for this factor was to determine if the spread of the Sovereign Citizen was merely 
a prison contagion or if the movement was thriving outside the walls of the Department 
of Corrections. In addition, I coded cases where the individual was espousing Sovereign 
rhetoric before, during, and after the trials. 
D. PRODUCTS 
I used a simple Excel spreadsheet to log the selection criteria from each case. The 
database is saved for future use, which can be located using the supplemental information 
at the end of this thesis. The present section provides a brief summary of how the 
database is organized. Search results from Lexis are numbered beginning with one and 
then ascending with each subsequent result. Column A of the databases reflect Lexis’ 
search result, which also double as my case study number for quick referencing. Columns 
B, C, and D contain general information copied directly from the front page of each case, 
which includes the case title, case or docket number, and courts respectively.  
Column E reflects the state in which the court resides that presided over the case. 
In rare occasions, such as transferred prisoners within the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the 
state in which the offense took place differed from the state in which an appeal or petition 
was filed. Column F pertains to the year, which again reflects the year in which the filing 
                                                 
72 Williams v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., LEXIS 163904 2015 U.S. Dist. (M.D. Ga. 2015). 
 29 
was submitted and decided, but not necessarily the year in which the offense took place. 
In most instances, the offense took place within the statutory limits of filing an appeal; 
but still others were filed years after a prisoner had been incarcerated. Such frivolous 
filings alone are considered in the activity.  
Column G provides the coding for cases that included individuals who proceeded 
as pro se (1), self-represented, as well as those granted in forma pauperis status (2), 
seeking a fee waiver. IFP and pro se are not necessarily correlated unto themselves, but in 
the Sovereigns history, they were in lockstep. Thus, for the purposes of this study, a study 
coded as IFP was also pro se, as they were filed together without any deviations. Column 
H explains the outcomes of each case, such as case dismissed, vacated, remanded, 
transferred. Column I expands on the outcomes to differentiate between the cases that 
were dismissed with prejudice or without leave to amend (1) and those simply dismissed.  
Column J contains the targets from each case. Extracting this information from 
the cases took the most time, as it takes some time to identify the opposing parties and 
their roles. In some cases, the United States was going after a Sovereign for tax fraud and 
in other cases Sovereigns were retaliating against government and justice officials for a 
myriad of frivolous reasons. The spectrum of targets was broad, but the trends were clear. 
Column K also took considerable time to complete as it lists the wide array of offenses or 
circumstances of the case. Here I identified both the circumstances of the original 
offenses as well as the intent of the legal filing. Thus, many cases have multiple labels 
within the circumstances column.  
Additionally, I grouped circumstances into categories in order to code for broader 
analysis. For example, a Sovereign may have been arrested for failure to stop, a traffic 
violation, or for using fictitious license plates, another traffic violation. In such cases, 
both are coded as traffic. If one case involved a Sovereign committing long term tax 
evasion and a separate case involved tax fraud, both are labeled as tax scheme. Moreover, 
a case’s block within column eleven may have multiple categories, such as drugs, fraud, 
money laundering, and jurisdictional challenge, such as the case of Shawn Pass, who was 
originally convicted of multiple counts of drug trafficking, fraud, and money laundering, 
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but then filed a frivolous sovereign petition from jail attacking the jurisdiction of the 
court many years later.73  
Finally, the Column L provides coding for when the individual first espoused 
Sovereign Citizen rhetoric in the face of a law enforcement or other such authority. 
Individuals who initiated some action against another, but not necessarily attached to an 
appeal or had some Sovereign type actions prior to a police encounter were assigned the 
number (1). Many Sovereigns who were arrested for a non-sovereign related offense, 
such as drug trafficking, would later discover the Sovereign way of life while 
incarcerated. For those individuals who launched a filing either while in custody or after 
release and were not arrested under a Sovereign Citizen type circumstance, then they 
were assigned the number (2) in the column. In some cases, the Sovereign was arrested 
for typical Sovereign infractions, such as traffic encounters or financial schemes and then 
continued using the Sovereign platform in the defense of their trial and throughout the 
appeals process while in prison. Such individuals were coded with the number (3) in the 
column, sovereign before and after their trial.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Outside of the Sovereign Citizen movement, a local agency could conduct a 
mirrored study focusing on gang violence, land rights activism, or any number of issues 
unique to a district. On a larger scale, agencies concerned with domestic 
counterterrorism, such as the DOJ, DHS, or the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, have resources at their disposal to conduct similar domestic, non-Islamic 
terrorism research using our existing criminal justice databases. And with greater access 
to resources, major federal agencies could perform studies such as this one to a much 
greater level of fidelity. It is my hope that agencies across the country take this study and 
continue the momentum to reduce the Sovereign Citizen threat and create new policy that 
keeps our streets and justice officials safe. 
                                                 
73 United States v. Pass, Appx. 832 413 Fed. (6th Cir. Ohio 2011). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
This chapter delves into the nuances of each of the 548 cases. Here we begin to 
discuss the qualitative details retrieved from the study. I was able to compile state 
statistics, which provides insight as to the level of Sovereign Citizen activity within 
specific states as well as across the popular regions of the United States. Furthermore, the 
research offered up which courts had the greatest number of Sovereigns passing through 
their chambers, thus implying which courts may have the most experience in dealing with 
such actors. Individual case outcomes offered shed further light on the manner in which 
the courts have handled Sovereigns standing before the bench and whether those 
Sovereigns chose legal representation by attorney or if they employed a popular 
Sovereign tactic of self-representation. The chapter concludes with who the Sovereigns 
target and with what tactics they most prefer. To my knowledge, no such study of this 
nature has been conducted; however, my hope is that it is not the last.  
A. STATE STATISTICS 
Spanning all 50 states, as well as Washington, DC, and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
(USVI), the study was as broad as the range of relevant cases in Lexis. Similarly, only 
four states posted no cases in the search: Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and 
North Dakota; Guam and Puerto Rico also did not feature among the cases. It is hard to 
say whether these states and territories have no Sovereigns in them or if, for example, the 
cases are charged or reported differently. Available historical accounts, as depicted in 
Chapter I, describe Sovereign roots growing out of the Pacific Northwest and northern-
tier states of the 1990s, nurtured by a century-old southern white supremacist, Christian 
extremism ideology. The evidence in this study shows that today, in contrast, the 
movement operates broadly, across multiple ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds, and 
within the states where one may least expect them.  
Figure 2 shows the 10 states with the most Sovereign-related legal activity over 
the past decade.  
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Figure 2.  States with Most Sovereign Citizen Activity 
The chart is a stacked column that reflects the total number of cases per state with 
each year color coded within the column. The data for all 50 states as well as the USVI is 
contained within Appendix A. One can generally see that each of the state’s cases are 
increasing in frequency as the timeline moves to the right. To further demonstrate the 




Shows the collective and individual growth of sovereign activity for the top 10 states over 
the past 10  years. 
Figure 3.  Sovereign Citizen Growth Chart 
The available literature on Sovereign roots, as explained in Chapter I, might 
create an expectation for concentrations of sovereign actions in the Pacific Northwest and 
Western Great Plains regions, such as Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. My data 
demonstrates that the distribution of Sovereign Citizens spans much farther than the old 




Depicts concentrations and regional problem areas for Sovereign Citizen activity. 
Figure 4.  Sovereign Citizen Incidents by State, Map 
The Eastern United States, as a major region, certainly faces the greatest 
concentrations. The Central East to North Eastern States see a considerable amount of 
Sovereign cases, as do states south of the Mason Dixon line. Illinois, in the heart of the 
country, has generated the most Sovereign activity in the court system, according to my 
data; California represented a rather distant second despite having a much larger 
population. I was also able to use the detailed state data to conduct further research, 
which permitted the identification of courts that have the most experience engaging 
Sovereigns in their game. 
B. COURT EXPERIENCE 
The data also showed which courts might have the most experience when it 
comes to dealing with the Sovereigns. Experienced courts may have developed effective 
procedures beyond administrative hurdles, but, conversely, courts may have also 
neglected the matter resulting in their increased frequency. Figure 5 reflects the 10 courts 
with the highest number of sovereign encounters.  
 35 
 
It is worth noting that Illinois has two courts represented within the graph. 
Figure 5.  Courts with Most Sovereign Citizen Experience 
Further study is possible within the courts identified to determine if any such best 
practices exist. The DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s office could initiate an investigation within 
these courts to uncover any such benchmarks or possible vulnerabilities. Courtroom 
procedures, clerk administrative practices, bailiff training, court staff safety, and other 
factors could improve if the knowledge of these experienced courts were shared. 
C. CASE OUTCOMES 
In the period under review, Sovereigns lost 93 percent of cases, largely because 
most of the cases failed to state a claim. Despite massive stacks of paperwork and 
nonsensical arguments, most simply did not state a claim in a succinct manner lending to 
the high rate of failure. Figure 6 reflects the total of each case’s outcome.  
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Figure 6.  Outcomes of Sovereign Citizen Cases, Last Five Years 
In seven cases, the justices refused to handle the matter or referred the case to 
another court’s jurisdiction to which I labeled as case transfers. In only two cases, the 
Sovereign litigant was punished with sanctions and fines for their frivolousness. Yet, 21 
cases met with some degree of success. When a Sovereign’s petition or motion was 
denied in part and granted in part, I deemed this a partial success. In some cases, a judge 
would deny a motion to dismiss, but then remand the case to a lower court for further 
determination. As such, the Sovereign would have another opportunity for success with 
the original action. True success, which accounts for only five cases, meant that the 
Sovereign either initiated an action against another party, such as justice official and 
either won the case, succeeded in blocking a Judge’s motion to dismiss, or otherwise 
walked away the victor.  
As an example, Walter-El Alkemet Shakur EL-Bey, Moorish Sovereign Citizen, 
succeeded in Alabama during a 2014 case seeking monetary relief against a judge. 
Previously known as Walter Earl Topps, El-Bey follows the ideology of the Moorish 
Science Temple, which is a Muslim-centered black-Islamic sect, and adherents of the 
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Sovereign Citizen Movement.74 El-Bey attempted to legally change his name, from 
Topps to El-Bey, but was prevented from doing so by a Macon County probate judge, 
due to religious discriminatory actions. El-Bey filed a lawsuit against the county judge 
for the alleged incident and the judge countered with a motion to dismiss the case, calling 
it moot, as El-Bey never actually filed the name change.75 The facts and procedural 
history provided by the USDC of Alabama deduced the situation: 
When EL-Bey presented his petition to legally change his name, [a] 
Macon County Probate Judge…spoke to [El-Bey] regarding his reason for 
requesting a name change as part of [the judge’s] usual “practice of 
reviewing petitions for a name change” …EL-Bey alleges that, during this 
discussion, [the] Judge questioned him about his religion, made remarks 
about Christianity, told EL-Bey he needed to take the petition “to a 
pastor,” threw the petition and other documents at EL-Bey, and instructed 
the clerk not to file the petition…the Judge stated that, as a result of this 
discussion, EL-Bey “reacted with hostility towards me and began shouting 
at me that I was violating his constitutional rights.” Although [the] Judge 
does not identify any “aggressive” or “irrational” behavior other than 
shouting, [the] Judge states that, after attempting to speak with EL-Bey to 
“calm him down,” he became concerned for his safety and the safety of his 
staff due to EL-Bey’s “aggressive” and “irrational behavior,” and he 
called courthouse security to escort EL-Bey from the courthouse…EL-Bey 
contends that he was arrested by local police after leaving the courthouse, 
and, during the arrest, he was told to “put [his] hands behind [his] back 
like you pray, you know how you pray?”76 
In this case, the USDC of Alabama reviewed the accused county judge’s motion 
to dismiss without succumbing to El-Bey’s Sovereign rhetorical defense. Instead of 
becoming blinded by the righteous arguments of El-Bey’s Moorish entitlements, the 
USDC reviewed the case’s actual circumstances, recognized that the county judge and 
court officers had denied EL-Bey’s request and further that they had engaged in 
discriminatory acts.77 The county judge’s motion to dismiss was denied and the case was 
set for a future trial, to which the outcome has yet to be determined. Though the case was 
                                                 





won by a Sovereign, it was not won due to Sovereign defense schemes; regardless, El-
Bey can chalk one point for the movement. 
In the context of Sovereign Citizens filing numerous frivolous filings, the manner 
in which a case was dismissed became an important factor for consideration. Cases 
dismissed with prejudice prevent the plaintiff from ever resubmitting an amended filing 
on the same matter.78 In some courts, terminology varies slightly. Instead of dismissing 
cases with prejudice, cases are dismissed without leave to amended, which invokes the 
same effect. Figure 7 demonstrates the rate at which courts employ the prejudice 
dismissal as well as dismissal without leave to amend as opposed to dismissing without 
prejudice or not specifying any prejudice.  
 
Differentiates between cases dismissed with and without prejudice. 
Figure 7.  Sovereign Citizen Case Dismissal Types 
                                                 
78 Legal Information Institute, “Dismissal with Prejudice.” 
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An astonishing 86 percent of cases were dismissed without prejudice despite the highly 
frivolous nature of the appeals and sometimes repetitive attempts. 
One case assessed exemplifies the recreational litigant term. Dr. Keenan Cofield, 
an incarcerated Sovereign Citizen who sought relief and credits from his various 
sentences, filed over 135 petitions clogging courts across the nation.79 Justice Bumb, who 
presided over Cofield’s 2014 petition uncovered in this study, commented on the scope of 
Cofield’s activity as well as warnings for further frivolous actions:80 
From this Court’s own research, Petitioner—prior to initiating the case at 
bar—has already commenced one hundred and fifteen civil matters in 
various federal district courts, including the [USDC]s for the Western and 
Eastern Districts of Virginia, Southern and Northern Districts of Alabama, 
Maryland, District of Columbia, Eastern Kentucky, Eastern Tennessee, 
Northern Florida, Kansas, Colorado, Northern Georgia, Eastern North 
Carolina, Southern New York, Northern Ohio, and Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. In addition, it appears that Petitioner has filed over twenty 
appellate actions with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, 
Sixth, Eleventh and Federal Circuits and several actions with the United 
States Supreme Court. Petitioner has now selected this District as his next 
target…This Court, therefore, strongly urges Petitioner to take his 
litigations in this District, and in all other federal courts, with utmost 
seriousness, since sanctions will be applied to Petitioner if he continues 
abusing the legal process.81 
What truly boggles the mind is that despite recounting the plights of all the courts 
listed, Justice Bumb dismissed Cofield’s actions, presumably his 136th attempt, without 
prejudice. Though Justice Bumb was correct to dismiss the frivolous petition and was 
further correct in providing written warning in regards to possible sanctions and fines, by 
missing the detail of dismissing the case with prejudice or without leave to amend, 
Justice Bumb left the gate open and allowed Cofield to simply file another petition in the 
near future. The Justice’s warning of possible sanctions is clearly late.  
Some states with seemingly high rates of dismissals with prejudice have relatively 
low levels of activity. It is possible that Sovereigns are aware of jurisdictions that dismiss 
                                                 




frivolous filings with higher rates than others. Therefore, I would recommend further 
study into the potential practices of those states with high percentages of frivolous cases 
dismissed with prejudice as a potential tool for curtailing Sovereign Citizen court actions. 
Table 1.   Ten States with the Highest Rate of Cases Dismissed with Prejudice. 
 
 
It is possible that South Dakota’s 100% rate of Sovereign Citizen cases dismissed 
with prejudice sends a message to the community. Likewise, Illinois’ lack of presence in 
Table 1 may also reflect a legal culture that allows Sovereigns to engage the courts in 
perpetuity, which may account for the state’s highest number of cases recorded. 
D. REPRESENTATION 
In addition to the manner of how the cases concluded, another key point 
uncovered was how the Sovereigns carried out their cases in terms of representation and 
financial proceedings. The Sovereigns’ appeals followed a highly consistent theme of 
pleas to proceed pro se and in forma pauperis among their nonsensical filings82 As Figure 
8 shows, 75 percent of Sovereign cases within the last five years involved subjects who 
sought self-representation–in some cases as a pointed tactic.  
                                                 
82 Legal Information Institute, “Pro Se.” 
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Identifies the distribution of those cases where the Sovereign selected an attorney to 
represent them, opted for pro se representation, and those who also sought in forma 
pauperis status in conjunction with a pro se action. 
Figure 8.  Self-Representation Statistics of Sovereign Citizen Cases, 
Last Five Years 
Gilkey v. USA provides an example of how Sovereigns use the pro se status as a 
tactic. Gilkey, a Sovereign who identified himself as “Ahnuck Musa Bey, an aboriginal 
indigenous American,” stood trial for multiple indictments spanning 2011 through 2015, 
which included felony weapons charges, drug possession, and falsified documents, as 
well as having run from police on multiple occasions, to include vehicle pursuits.83 
During the trial, Gilkey fired his attorney, proceeded pro se, and began espousing 
Sovereign rhetoric. The Tennessee USDC wisely required his attorney to remain on as 
“elbow counsel,” however. Such lawyers are literally or figuratively at the pro se 
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defendant’s side to clarify terms or procedures. In accordance with the defendant’s 
wishes, they are not engaged in defense, but they can and do help citizens navigate the 
technicalities of a court proceeding.84 In his first trial, Gilkey was found guilty on six 
counts and sentenced to 300 months for each of the first three and 60 months for the final 
three to all be served concurrently, meaning at the same time. Thus, Gilkey faced 25 
years of incarceration.85 
After sentencing, Gilkey appealed, arguing that the court “denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel because his attorney failed to file a direct appeal after being 
asked to do so.”86 It was a curious argument for a defendant representing himself—
though the point of the appeal may simply been to delay punishment or further 
inconvenience the court. In this case, because Gilkey was granted pro se status and the 
court required his attorney to remain on as an elbow counsel, his appeal was denied in 
accordance with case law established in Farreta v. California, where the U.S. Supreme 
Court established that “a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter 
complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance 
of counsel.”87  
The second factor regarding how a Sovereign proceeded financially possessed yet 
further intriguing factors. The way a pro se representation required the courts to provide 
more liberal reviews of filings, in forma pauperis, or the permission to proceed without 
paying any fees, places additional unique constraints on some courts.88 While seemingly 
benign at first, gaining in forma pauperis status serves a tactical purpose in Sovereigns’ 
paper terrorism objectives. While some Sovereigns attempt to proceed in forma pauperis 
simply for purposes of seeking a fee waiver, convicted Sovereigns have capitalized on 
prison wisdom to manipulate the rule. Courts have dismissed cases when individuals 
                                                 
84 FindLaw, “Case Summary, Tennessee v. Small,” Find Law, April 12, 1999, 
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86 Ibid. 
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have been granted in forma pauperis status, in accordance with a type of three-strikes 
appeal rule that the Eleventh Circuit Court established in 2002 within the case law of 
Dupree v. Palmer: “The proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint 
without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant 
to the three strikes provision of § 1915(g).”89  
To simplify, this rule applies to the incarcerated only and if a prisoner submits 
three frivolous petitions, the prisoner cannot submit another filing while also not paying 
the filing fee and attempting to acquire in forma pauperis status. However, as shown in 
the 2015 case of Williams v. Georgia Department of Corrections, Williams submitted 
filings beyond his third frivolous attempt and in an in forma pauperis fashion, which the 
passed through the various rungs of the DOJ, culminating with Justice Royal’s 
determination to dismiss the filing, without prejudice, as in done by both all of the USDC 
and Circuit Courts.90 Prisoners still retain the right to file legal petitions and appeals in 
their defense. The rule allows for swift dismissal, but it does not prevent the individual 
from filing the same case repeatedly.  
It appears that all that is needed to clog the process, to this regard, is to submit a 
frivolous filing, with an in forma pauperis request. The meritless submission will be 
recorded, processed, reviewed by an appellate level justice, in forma pauperis denied, and 
then subsequently dismissed without prejudice; permitting the Sovereign to do it again 
and again. The justices are empowered to conduct swift reviews, without considering the 
merits of the fourth and subsequent filings on the same matter, but only if the prisoner 
does not pay the filing fee and attempts to proceed in forma pauperis. Frustratingly, this 
game Sovereigns play comes at a cost for the courts in the form of human resources and 
precious time, but the sovereign prisoner gets to play for free.  
E. SOVEREIGNS’ ACTIONS 
Sovereign Citizens’ intentions range from extreme violence to the subtle 
resistance of government. To a Sovereign Citizen, federal, state, or local law enforcement 
                                                 
89 Dupree v. Palmer, F.3d 1234 284 (11th Cir. Fla 2002). 
90 Williams v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., LEXIS 163904 2015 U.S. Dist. (M.D. Ga. 2015). 
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is, at best, irrelevant because the law that they enforce is illegitimate, according to the 
Sovereigns. Paper terrorism, the tool of choice for the Sovereign Citizen, takes the form 
of both white-collar crime as well as harassing tactics against government officials. Paper 
terrorism is a term coined by the DOJ, which encompasses false liens, frivolous court 
complaints, and other bogus financial schemes.91 Few studies deal systematically with 
paper-terrorism or any of the less spectacular—but arguably more effective—Sovereign 
tactics. The present study looked carefully at the circumstances of these relevant cases. 
Figure 9 shows the breadth of Sovereign tactics as discovered from this detailed review. 
 
Figure 9.  Proclivity of Tactics Employed by Sovereign Citizens 
For purposes of this study, the highest activity by far was the attempt to challenge 
a court’s jurisdiction, procedure, or legitimacy in some way, thereby clogging the court 
systems. In those challenges, the Sovereign frequently failed to state a claim, but instead 
                                                 
91 Department of Justice, "Counterterrorism White Paper" (Washington D.C., 2006), 
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rambled on in an attempt to prove the illegitimacy. Second, retaliation against individuals 
for some perceived injustice typically accompanied the jurisdictional challenge. Tax 
related schemes, various fraud and real estate schemes, and traffic violations round out 
the top five sovereign actions and encounters. Jurisdictional challenges, the highest level 
of activity, presented most commonly in the form of a habeas corpus action initiated by 
the Sovereign, and in some cases in rapid succession by recreational litigants.  
Habeas corpus actions generally are used by a litigant to force a court to examine 
the previous court’s decision and in some cases, as an appeal in itself, since the Sovereign 
believes the court convicted the fictitious Strawman and not the flesh and blood 
individual, as the Latin derivative of the terms mean to present the body.92 For example, 
Smith-Bey filed six habeas actions within six months challenging his 2014 conviction, all 
of which were summarily dismissed with prejudice.93  
F. SOVEREIGNS’ TARGETS 
 Broad-ranging tactics are not distributed among a broad range of targets. 
Sovereigns have a clear target, justice officials to include judges, law enforcement 
officers, corrections officers, as well as other members of the judicial system. Figure 10 
reflects the distribution of targets selected by the Sovereign citizens studied herein. 
Second and a third place are earned by private-party individuals and financial institutions, 
respectively. The IRS, other federal government offices, and federal officers, including 
the president, are all in the crosshairs of the Sovereign Citizen movement.  
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Figure 10.  Distribution of Targets from Sovereign Citizen Cases, 
Last Five Years 
 When all of the government-type targets are placed into the same category and 
compared to the remaining non-governmental targets, a clear statement is made. In all, 
some 85 percent of the cases from the past five years targeted a government official or 
other government office in some capacity. Figure 11 provides a graphic representation 
that demonstrates the grave level of hate the Sovereign’s have for the U.S. government 




Figure 11.  Preferred Sovereign Targets, Government versus Other 
G. SOVEREIGN BEFORE OR AFTER THE LAW-ENFORCEMENT 
ENCOUNTER? 
The last criteria studied from the data mined from the Lexis results involved how 
to differentiate between those subjects who were sovereign adherents before their 
encounter with the law from those who became followers of the sovereign canon after 
having been convicted for several years. Additionally, some cases involved a sovereign 
initiating some action outside of a legal infraction. Figure 12 shows the distribution of 




Figure 12.  Distribution of When Sovereign Citizens Became Adherents to the 
Ideology 
Fifty-eight percent of the cases involved a Sovereign Citizen who had been an 
adherent to the ideology prior to a DOJ encounter, while 42 percent learned of the tactics 
and ideology after having been incarcerated. The data supports the Anti-Defamation 
League’s research on Sovereigns and their assertions that recruitment into the ideology 
and use of tactics has become infectious with the federal prison system.94 The Federal 
Bureau of Prisons classifies high-risk inmates for special controls and monitoring, to 
which the Sovereigns have earned the moniker; however, it would seem that the controls 
in place to thwart sovereign recruitment and training are insufficient.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The data contained in this chapter compels one to question the administrative 
processes in place within our court systems as well as the organization of our domestic 
intelligence collection policies. With such clear evidence that a rising trend exists, where 
is the response? While the work is highly expositional and less prescriptive, this first step 
                                                 
94 Anti-Defamation League, “Lawless Ones.” 12-14. 
 49 
was necessary to prove the rising trend and also to expose quality data from which policy 
decision and further study could be launched. I posit that the Sovereign Citizen 
Movement grows out of a lack of awareness on the part of our government due to a 
shortage of studies such as this.  
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IV. EXPLANATIONS AND CONTEXT 
Government reports warn of a rise in Sovereign activity, yet they only focus on 
the most violent offenses, offering only a handful of cases that appear to reference only 
each other. Furthermore, none has addressed the underlying conditions that are leading to 
their assumed rise in sovereign activity. Chapter III addressed the problem of missing 
data. Now, this chapter explains the Sovereign Citizen Movement growth while 
providing context as to the conditions permitting the growth. Decades-old concepts of 
social movements are still applicable yet are still not applied to problems of the day. Gaps 
in current policy, the lack of actions undertaken by higher agencies, and a review of the 
antecedent conditions of social movements reveal why the Sovereign Citizen movement 
has grown so rampantly. 
A. GAPS IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other foreign-born terrorist regimes have dominated U.S. 
policy decisions and the attention of the intelligence community since 9/11. This focus is 
sensible, granted the threat, but it is incomplete. The habit of looking only in one 
direction—outward—leave policy and intelligence officials blind or at least under-
informed about the threat of violence and even terrorism from within Sovereign circles in 
the United States. Moreover, the contemporary political climate, in both the executive 
and judicial branches, has caused major ideological polarization among politicians and 
the American public steer further policy decisions that will undoubtedly feed the fire of 
both right- and left-wing violence to include acts of domestic terrorism, which the 
government is not equipped to counter.  
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 created 
major structural changes and began to define parameters for activities. The act delineated 
between foreign, domestic, and homeland security intelligence activity; however, it did 
not require that resources or focuses be balanced among the three focuses.95 Furthermore, 
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the IRTPA of 2004 created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 
and further granted budgetary authority to the ODNI in order to grow the National 
Intelligence Program (NIP) in a manner that could counter threats faced in the current 
century, to include hiring up to 500 employees to this end.96 In addition to defining the 
role, responsibilities, and opportunities of the DNI, the IRTPA of 2004 also contained 
specific terrorism prevention provisions. Particularly, it addresses actions that would now 
be punishable by law, such as involvement with known terrorist organizations, receiving 
military training from a known organization, as well as taking part in any terrorist or 
military hoax.97 Moreover, the act provided legislation to secure funding for specific 
technology improvements, such as financial tools and the National Incident Command 
System, as well as additional human resources in order to increase security among the 
various travel routes for both passenger and cargo.98  
Perhaps the most important aspect of the IRTPA of 2004 goes back to the opening 
lines of the previous paragraph, which is that the act is steered by the influence of the 
DNI. Vice Admiral Michael McConnell, former DNI identified the gap in this strategic 
guidance when he said during an open forum, “the effectiveness of the DNI today is 
entirely personality dependent, based on the way the law is written.”99 The IRTPA lacks 
verbiage requiring the DNI and IC to spread resources among all three aspects of national 
intelligence: foreign, domestic, and homeland security. What the IRTPA does not lack is 
the thematic attack on foreign based, radical Islamic inspired terrorist activity and an 
overarching emphasis on the protection of civil liberties.  
Prior to the IRTPA of 2004, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 stood as the first 
major reform aimed at fostering information sharing and enhanced collection to include 
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collection of telephone metadata on American civilians if necessary.100 If the intelligence 
community was concerned about finding a needle in a haystack before, the collection of 
telephone metadata compounded the problem by creating millions of haystacks. Mark 
Lowenthal writes about the collection of metadata, stating that it included “numbers of 
the telephones involved in the call and the date, time, and length of call” but that later 
provisions by the DNI legal counsel required that the data only be made available “if 
there is a reasonable suspicion that a telephone number is associated with specified 
foreign terrorist organizations.”101 Much of the language, one can see, is borrowed from 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which was enacted during a growing 
cold war era of foreign agents and a period of aircraft hijackings.102 Here, one can see 
again the emphasis on foreign terrorist organizations and a lack of attention on domestic 
terrorism other than a perpetual need to protect the politically sensitive dilemma of civil 
liberty infringement versus public safety and security. 
The culture within a system rewards behavior and directly influences the 
development of certain capabilities while simultaneously diminishing the robustness of 
other capabilities.103 The IRTPA of 2004 and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 both 
initiated momentum towards enhanced intelligence collection, analysis, technology, and 
funding; however, they allowed the growth to manifest in a demand system, capitalist-
like, rather than in a rational system. As alluded to in the opening paragraph, routine is 
the enemy. Zegart writes about this effect in her account for causes leading to the 
September 11, 2001, attacks. The FBI possessed a law enforcement culture; one with the 
relentless hunger for competent evidence leading to a conviction, which caused the 
dismissal of factors that could have uncovered the terror plot.104 Earlier, as learned from 
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the FBI’s law enforcement approach sought 
                                                 
100 Lowenthal, Intelligence. 31, 124. 
101 Ibid. 124. 
102 95th Congress, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, H.R.7308, 1978, 
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/hspci1978.pdf. 
103 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, The FBI, and The Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 2007). 
104 Zegart, Spying Blind. 
 54 
evidence to close the case, thereby potentially missing the bigger picture and missed 
factors leading to future attacks.105 As Crumpton points out, the FBI seeks to build the 
case following the incident, whereas intelligence, namely the CIA, seeks to stop the 
incident before it happens.106 An incentive structure that rewards the closure of a case 
and conviction of a suspect does not necessarily promote the collection of valuable 
intelligence on peripheral activity leading to a greater scheme. Similarly, policy focused 
on the pursuit of international terrorist plots, reward the offices who thwart such plots 
with funding, increased human resources, technology, promotions, and so forth. Thus, 
pursuit of Al-Qaeda and ISIS abroad and at home became a growth market. Pursuit of 
anything else non-convictable and domestic became second priority or simply did not 
rank as a priority. Routines are easily exploited and if present, they immediately expose 
the weakness of the system. If one were to analyze any system, such as a fitness routine, 
and saw that the individual only engaged in a long-distance, low-intensity, long-duration, 
aerobic training regimen, then one can easily deduce that the same individual would fail 
if challenged with a series of high-intensity, short-duration, maximum-effort challenges. 
Conversely, if an individual only engaged in the high-intensity maximum effort 
challenges, then that same individual would fail if forced to perform the long duration 
challenges. The same concept can be seen in government policy. Overinvestment in one 
sector comes at the expense of another. In the context of domestic intelligence 
combatting homegrown, non-foreign inspired terrorism, the routine of pursuing Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS exclusively, has left the surveillance of American antigovernment groups 
unattended with a void of information regarding the issue. 
A compounding factor that adds to the lack of organized government response 
includes issue saliency. As Chamberlain and Haider-Markel’s “Lien on Me” article 
argues, issue saliency concerns how well the public is informed of an issue and how high 
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it ranks in the minds of policy makers.107 The article argues that regional influences are 
the primary causal factor as to why some states adopted laws to counter right-wing 
extremism. Chamberlain and Haider-Markel determined that the level of political 
attention, garnered by the degree of the public’s awareness of the issue, and the position 
of a neighboring state on the matter, determined whether or not the state adopted laws to 
specifically counter bogus lien attempts by right-wing extremists.108 The correlation not 
determinative; however, some states did not adopt such laws despite having high 
numbers of incidents. Moreover, the media possesses an urban bias, as well as an 
international terrorism bias, that skews the news coverage, thereby inhibiting issue 
saliency for domestic extremism.109 Moreover, the lack of for-profit media interest has 
resulted in the creation of a “virtual network sphere” to provide the communication 
medium for the Sovereign Citizen Movement as well as other single interest movements, 
such as from the concealed carry advocates.110 Simply stated, news coverage and media 
sensationalism are not concerned with diverse reporting. Instead the various media 
conglomerates are concerned with ratings, profits, and matters of business, to which the 
coverage fixates on the available viewers, who are predominantly from urban and 
suburban areas and not from the rural. Therefore, the public at large will not hear of the 
Sovereigns until the sensational story hits the airwaves, such as was the case with Gavin 
Long in Baton Rouge. 
B. THE AGENCIES 
The ODNI and DHS Intelligence and Analysis division (DHS I&A) have both 
experience turbulent organizational change since their inception. Rapid fire leadership 
changes and a chronic need to restructure the organizational charts of both agencies have 
prevented any chance at effective development of domestic non-Islamic terrorist 
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intelligence collection. DHS I&A is headed by an undersecretary, now a politically 
appointed position, which changed hands seven times between 2003 and 2010.111 The 
I&A division’s humble beginnings started in a partially condemned building where 
analysts would share desks and terminals, while dealing with failing climate controls, 
inoperable restrooms, and other unhealthy work conditions.112 Today, the infrastructure 
has improved, but the organizational chart is still subject to turbid conditions. Previous 
DNI General James Clapper, stated in 2014, “as I’ve gotten older, I’ve gotten less and 
less enamored of reorganization as a method of curing some problem…you redo the 
wiring diagram and it makes the poobahs on the seventh floor happy, but in the trenches 
those reorganizations have consequences in ways the senior authorities will never 
see.”113 The relentless pursuit of foreign-inspired domestic terrorism has had the second- 
and third-order effect of boosting the support for the federal intelligence capabilities that 
supports the overseas warfighter, but has left the homeland law enforcement and 
domestic intelligence capabilities in the rearview mirror.  
John Carlin, assistant attorney general for National Security, affirmed that the 
attention on domestic terrorism has paled in comparison to international terrorism.114 If 
the U.S. Attorney’s office is serious about combatting domestic extremism, then tracking 
mechanisms for monitoring the rate and type of occurrences needs to be created, 
published, and broadcasted. Missing information leads to misinformation, which then 
steers the political conversation as well as the resources afforded to combat domestic 
terrorism. As Dr. Heidi Beirich of the SPLC and Assistant Attorney General John Carlin 
concur that “it is matter of ‘and’ not ‘or’ for what the United States is facing.”115 
Unfortunately, in 2014, the DOJ’s official release on the initiative to restart the Domestic 
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Terrorism Executive Committee, specifically addressed the external radical Islamic 
terrorist threat, without a word about internal American threats.116 Prior to the DTEC 
rekindling, the DOJ released a counterterrorism white paper that possessed broader 
language, roping in domestic threats from broad categories, but somehow, in the recent 
decade, the intent has been dropped in favor of pursuing the Islamic terrorist.117 The 
country must shift resources as to create balance between domestic, international, and 
homeland security intelligence needs. Domestic intelligence must abide by civil liberty 
protections, thus, an operator’s abilities to collect on U.S. citizens within the United 
States is, and must be, regulated. Perhaps intelligence oversight, however, is not the 
major barrier, but instead resource management requires new focus. 
A major consideration of why the intelligence community focuses so heavily 
abroad may be seen in the assignment of Joint Duty within the ODNI. Former DNI 
General James Clapper commented on the transformation of the IC world due to this 
Joint Duty and how analysts coming together from various disciplines will have a 
profound impact on growing the ranks of analysts.118 On the other hand, this arrangement 
also created a culture of intelligence analysts that are grown under a primarily federal 
influence, most notably by the Department of Defense. If the primary influencer in that 
system is the DOD, who is permanently constrained by law from collecting intelligence 
on U.S. citizens, then the notion of having a robust domestic intelligence collection and 
counterterrorism program is moot. Joint duty may expand the tradecraft, but it 
specifically excludes the domestic intelligence focus. 
Developing talent is a challenge for any organization. By 2009, the DHS I&A 
division was organized by assigning analysts to deep dive into their respective domestic 
terror organizations, gaining a thorough comprehension of their subject matter, but the 
team was disbanded after the release of a controversial right-wing report.119 As of 2012, 
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the domestic intelligence collection on non-Islamic domestic terrorism has been 
organized by region, geographically dividing up areas of responsibility.120 Dividing the 
focus across large sums of responsibility with other initiatives may appear standard 
practice, the method; however, does not work for pursuing an adversary. The DHS I&A 
spread young analysts across the country to take over regions before they were well-
versed in the various threats. Distributing analysts as such effectively removed subject 
matter experts from their research and forced them to collect and analyze information on 
groups with which they were unfamiliar.121  
The primary issue addressed here is the disconnect between the tactical level law 
enforcement and the federal and state domestic intelligence policies and organizational 
structure. Law enforcement agencies and officers are in the greatest danger from 
violence-minded Sovereigns, yet due to the organizational issues of the domestic 
intelligence arm of our government and the gaps in domestic terrorism policy, officers are 
forced to face the Sovereign Citizen with minimal training or no training what so ever. 
Some departments have taken it upon themselves to conduct research and devise training 
plans for their officers. For example, the Florida Sheriffs Association developed a 
comprehensive training video in concert with other agencies, such as the West Memphis 
Police Department which tragically lost two officers, Brandon Paudert and Bill Evans, 
that far surpasses any attempt by DOJ, FBI, DHS, or any government entity.122 Local 
departments are partnering with nongovernment organizations, like the SPLC, to build 
their training plans, not the FBI or DHS. Warnings and indicators should be delivered by 
federal and state domestic intelligence agents, via fusion centers and networks, not from 
media outlets and NGOs. Without a procedural change within the intelligence 
community, the warnings will remain absent.  
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C. SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
Several authors have offered theories to explain why Sovereigns engage in 
criminal acts and paper terrorism. Collective Behavior Theory, originally articulated by 
Neil Smelser in 1965, is used by Arnold Baldoza, NPS Graduate, to assess the right-wing 
political fringe.123 Baldoza explains that “collective behavior is determined by structural 
conduciveness, structural strain, growth and spread of a generalized belief, precipitating 
factors, mobilization of participants for action, and the operation of social controls.”124 
Baldoza asserts that   
Although major social structures (i.e., structural conduciveness, structural 
strain, and ideology) in the contemporary United States create a climate 
within which right-wing extremism can emerge and flourish, the lack of an 
influential leader to unify the far right and the effective operation of 
existing social controls—including the rejection of right-wing ideologies 
by mainstream Americans—hinder the mobilization of the domestic far 
right.125 
Essentially, Baldoza argues that a single unifying leader plus an American public 
that approves or permits the activity, are necessary for the growth of the movement. I 
argue against the need for centralized control for movements. Communications networks, 
social media, and technology have replaced the booming leaders’ voice. With persistent 
and recycled messages floating in the electronic ether, the ideology endures despite the 
lack of a single unifying leader. Furthermore, the American mainstream may not reject 
the far right-wing entirely, but instead may sympathize to some degree, while rejecting 
violence. Rejecting violence is not the same as rejecting the sentiment. 
Lane Crothers explores three synergistic theories: Social Movement, Resource 
Mobilization, and Political Process as alternative explanations for the rise and decline of 
right-wing activity. In Social Movement theory, Crothers explains that “individuals who 
perceive that injustices have been committed against the values and ideals through which 
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they define the purpose of their lives, the nature of right and wrong, and the purposes and 
ends of the community’s shared life, are likely to react and push for social change.”126 
For Sovereigns, the perceived injustice could be acute, for example a traffic citation, or 
systemic—as in the belief in the straw-man and a fictitious corporate government.  
Crothers also writes that the growth of movements can be attributed to resource 
mobilization theory as  
movements emerge whenever the political system provides sufficient 
resources for the movement’s development, including splits in the 
dominant governing consensus within a community, the defection of large 
numbers of people from traditional patterns of political support and 
participation, or sudden problems that emerge that government cannot 
address.127  
A split in the dominant governing consensus is reflected by the adversarial 
politics of today’s congressional culture. Major societal differences are present in areas 
with a mayor or governor following either a democratic or republican camp. Social 
movements, such as the recent Black Lives Matter Movement, represent a sudden 
problem that the government cannot address. Regardless of a movement’s intentions or 
ideology, it is an indicator of the antecedent conditions supporting resource mobilization 
theory. Simply put, Crothers’ depiction of resource mobilization would call for a special 
blend of timing and politics that would lend to an uprising and the United States has 
arrived at that point. 
Lastly, Political Process theory, as Crothers explains, consists of three factors:  
organizational strength—well organized, well-supported movements can 
be expected to last longer…the political context—the distribution of 
groups and individuals, capacities of state agencies to address movement 
demands, and the like that influences whether or not a movement can 
succeed…and possesses a logical reason to exist—when different 
components of the political system respond favorably to the group, it is 
more likely to succeed.128  
                                                 




A structural perspective grows from this theory, where one could deconstruct the 
movement into one of the three parts. Movements, then, would require organizational 
strength, a political connection, and a logical reason to exist. Crothers notes that the 
Patriot movement of the 1990s declined partly due to the change in political context and 
the increased legislation that countered their actions. On the one hand, increased right-
wing political support removed the need for the militias to exist, while, on the other hand, 
the hardcore cadre moved underground for fear of prosecution, thereby removing their 
organizational strength.129 Crothers’ would argue then, as politicians support tax 
reductions, fewer firearm restrictions, and other typically right-leaning agendas that a 
decline in activity should be expected from groups like Patriot militias. Sovereign 
Citizens, however, do not necessarily fit this mold.  
Sovereign Citizens fit into several of the theories above, but not entirely. Social 
Movement theory, offered by Crothers, presents the best theory available to diagnose the 
Sovereigns. Over the past decade, the political culture of the United States has reached a 
chronic level of divisiveness and adversarial politics that emboldens the Sovereign’s 
ideology. A movement with a belief in a corrupt and illegitimate government as a core 
tenet finds sufficient cause with the existing political polarization. Citizens disillusioned 
that the cause of their hardships originate from a corrupt system find solace in the thought 
that the present system is fictional, the incorporated idea brought upon the masses to 
enslave, not liberate. The further the Sovereign researches into the past, more nuggets of 
conspiracy are uncovered as they pluck a piece of legislation or statute that meets their 
need. When the justice official crosses their path and violates that which has become a 
fundamental principle of their lives, the grievance boils and the Sovereign lashes.  
D. POLITICAL CLIMATE 
At the time of this writing, Senator Bernie Sanders, Former Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, and Donald Trump were all contending for the 2016 presidential 
election. The campaign—and most likely the election—is apt to stoke the embers of 
antigovernment fervor. According to PEW research polls, the present political divide 
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between left and right, looks more like a canyon rather than a saddle with a void in the 
moderate center.130 (See Figure 13.)  
 
Pew Research collected data over a 20-year period comparing the political polarization in 
America. These two charts reflect the beginning point of the study and end point, which 
reflects a loss of a politically moderate center. Pew Research’s graphic is fully animated 
and one can visually see the divide take place during the 20-year study.131 
Figure 13.  Pew Research, Political Polarization 1994-2014132 
President Obama elegantly described the strength of a healthy two-party system 
democracy works when you have two parties that are serious, trying to 
solve problems, they have philosophical differences, and they have fierce 
debates, and they argue…where they can sit across the table from one 
another and have a principled argument and ultimately can still move the 
country forward.133  
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The political environment over the past decade, however, has not mirrored 
Obama’s comments. Instead, the moderate center is being abandoned and now fringe left- 
and right-wing comments are more common in the political discourse.  
For example, in 2010, an antigovernment extremist named Joseph Stack, loaded 
his private plane with a drum of gasoline and then proceeded to crash the aircraft into the 
IRS building near Austin, Texas. He left behind a manifesto detailing his lost bout with 
the IRS along with other perceived grievances. Less than 60 days following the attack, 
DHS publicly announced that the attack was personal and not domestic terror. Note that 
less than year prior, in 2009, the DHS Intelligence and Analysis had been disbanded 
following the controversial right-wing report.134 Congress disagreed with DHS and 
passed House Resolution 1127 in response, declaring the attack was an act of domestic 
terrorism. Shortly after the attack, House Representative Steve King provided 
commentary on the matter, “I think if we would’ve abolished the IRS back when I first 
advocated it, he [Stack] wouldn’t have a target for his airplane…and I’m still for 
abolishing the IRS.”135 Senator Ted Cruz and others were also heard on their 2016 
presidential campaign trail espousing the same rhetoric.136 In other words, calls for such 
measures as abolishing the Internal Revenue Service—which one may expect to hear 
only from extremists—also come today from sitting senators, house representatives, and 
presidential candidates. Not to say that some elected representatives are terrorist 
sympathizers, but the volatile messaging and adversarial politics, coming from both the 
left and the right, lend credence to the Sovereign Citizens, as well as other violent 
movements. As such, Smelser’s collective behavior theory manifests here, as the “growth 
and spread of a generalized beliefs” begin to find a home in both mainstream discussions 
and Sovereign teachings.  
A Sovereign’s belief system lives on the same political plane as the country’s 
founders, past presidents, and mainstream public ideals that dominate the thoughts of 
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what American means. The movement spans the various flavors of Christian, Islamic, 
Moorish, Patriot, Militia, and common criminal Sovereigns. Believing that the 
government is illegitimate does not mean the Sovereign believes that the previous 
American government system was wrong. Hating the IRS for imposing what they feel are 
unfair tax laws does not mean that they are against taxation for public goods. Sovereigns 
are Americans, citizens of the state, who have a baseline belief in the freedoms afforded 
in the constitution. This paragraph is not intended to defend the actions of Sovereign 
extremists. It is necessary, however, to identify how closely the movement follows 
mainstream American beliefs, despite their stance on the status quo.  
To place the Sovereign Citizen movement into context, compare it against an 
extreme Islamic fundamentalist terror organization, such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda. Terror 
organizations such as these do not possess a collective system that follows anything 
remotely like that of the United States. Ideas about what government should or should not 
be differs drastically from a consolidated democracy. Notions of civil liberties and 
guaranteed freedoms do not align either. Thus, counterterrorism policy makers, media 
outlets, police, and the American public have little trouble with labeling organizations 
such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist threats. Labeling a U.S. citizen as a terrorist because 
he or she fired a weapon at an IRS building over having to pay an adjusted minimum tax, 
seems more difficult for fellow Americans and policy makers. Sovereigns share similar 
beliefs, frustrations, and values that most Americans possess. Possessing parallel beliefs, 
however, does not lessen the impact of their terrorist acts, nor does it excuse their 
intentions. Parallel beliefs may simply delay policy makers and the public from 
describing the act with the necessary level of heinousness to garner the appropriate level 
of response. 
The U.S. antiterrorism policies and legislation have carried a narrow focus on a 
singular adversary for the past three decades; foreign and Islamic, the bad guys from 
abroad. Funding, resources, technology, and human capital have been invested in 
building the capacity to counter the foreign borne radical Islamic terrorist threat. The 
capacity to address domestic non-Islamic terrorist threat has been neglected. Moreover, 
the basic theories of social movements that have applied for the past decades, in some 
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cases 50 years, are still applicable today. The political climate and discourse perpetuated 
by the current U.S. government leaders further bolster the Sovereign Citizen message. 
Due to a lack of issue saliency, the public and the responsible agencies do not possess the 
awareness necessary to feel the need to devote resources toward countering the 
Sovereigns. The United States is ignoring a rapidly metastasizing cancer. One in which 
the responsible parties are aware, but have instead chosen to focus on other matters. The 
growth is becoming exponential and will soon lead to catastrophe if not addressed 
immediately and deliberately with policy that reflects balance among the domestic 
intelligence practices. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
My brothers and sisters in blue across the nation face challenges that the public 
may never comprehend. Every day they must engage with violators of the law, violators 
of the basic institutions of the United States. It has been my pleasure to work towards a 
product that may contribute to their safety as well as guide future policy makers toward 
effective solutions when dealing with movements such as the Sovereign Citizens.  
As a U.S. Air Force Security Forces officer with 18 years of experience, 11 years 
of which were spent enlisted, I approached my thesis requirement with one focus, protect 
my family. That family spans the federal, state, local, and tribal lines of jurisdiction as 
well as the citizens of this amazing country. Prior experience within the fields of 
antiterrorism and crime prevention had exposed me to incidents such as the Oklahoma 
City bombing and siege events at Waco, Texas, but as I delved into the homeland 
security curricula, I quickly noticed the glaring difference between the abundant 
government information Islamic, foreign terror threat and the non-Islamic domestic terror 
threats. The tragic reports of officers meeting their fates at the hands of domestic 
extremists should have stoked action. Moreover, officers may have a better chance at 
survival if the culture of domestic intelligence were more balanced. Acts of paper 
terrorism could have been averted were simple administrative procedures identified with 
the courts. But efforts at saving officers from harm and safeguarding victims of 
Sovereign tactics have been neglected. The growth of the Sovereign Citizen Movement 
stands as a single case study, but I speculate that threats of a domestic nature extend 
beyond this fringe group. If the United States does not take action swiftly, then violent 
social movements of this century may be the downfall of our nation. Putin, ISIS, or some 
other external threat will not cause our ruin, for we have thoroughly demonstrated our 
resolve to combat an external threat. Our true challenge is one within and one we have 
avoided far too long; we need to address our own actions and behaviors within our 
borders. 
One will find that I have uncovered the story of the Sovereign Citizen in an effort 
to paint a comprehensive picture for policy makers, police departments, and researchers. 
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Sovereign activity is on the rise at an alarming rates. As the background information 
summarized, the Sovereign ideology is widespread with tactics finding roots in the 
antigovernment activity by the Patriot Militias of the 1990s; however, the ideology is 
now adopted by a much broader consortium including the Moorish Movements and 
demographics outside the typical stereotype. The quantitative look at 548 Sovereign 
Citizen cases over the past ten years as demonstrated an increasing frequency in incidents 
with each year. A qualitative study within the past five years, accounting for 440 of those 
cases provided detailed insight into the regional concentrations, court statistics, as well as 
specific criteria such as target and tactic preference. Further the study shed light on 
nuances regarding Sovereign Representation and filing procedures that were previously 
undetected and unreported. While suspected by scholars and the FBI, I have proven that 
Sovereigns primarily target justice officials through frivolous filing. Government officials 
are in the crosshairs, as are the court rooms, but anyone crossing their paths and oppose 
their will are fair game in the eyes of a Sovereign.  
I conclude here with various policy recommendations, intended to safeguard court 
staff and time, defend our fine police corps, reform the domestic intelligence culture, and 
advise future legislation to ensure that domestic terrorism policy is balanced between 
threats foreign and domestic.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The Courts 
Frivolous filings clog the courts. As demonstrated in Chapter III, Sovereigns lost 
396 of the 440 cases spanning the past five years, the majority of which were because the 
Sovereign failed to state a claim and were meritless, despite the massive paperwork filed. 
Judges applied sanctions against only two Sovereigns. Furthermore, 86  percent of cases 
were dismissed without prejudice, allowing the Sovereign to amend the filings and 
submit the frivolous action again and again. As the frivolous cases are filed, the 
paperwork flows through the courts, delaying other’s legitimate proceedings, and 
eventually requires the review of a judge, some cases reaching as high as the Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  
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In order to combat this action, I recommend that the courts, nationwide, 
implement a procedure to review submissions at the time of entry, requiring that a 
plaintiff, appellee, petitioner, or any other individual seeking court action, provide a 
summary of the claim on a top page of the filing. Similar to an executive summary. A 
succinct statement of what the accused did to wrong the plaintiff, what the petitioner 
seeks, or what the appellee claims for relief. A single page document or form can be 
provided at the time of filing, or completed ahead of time, filled in by the individual or 
attorney. A clerk then reviews the claim and if no specific claim is made, or if an entity 
that is not prosecutable, such as the entire U.S. government, then the claim is rejected. If 
the filing presents a claim, then the filing results in a frivolous finding or meritless claim, 
sanctions are imposed on the first offense. Further, subsequent meritless claims by the 
same individual, even for different purposes, are met with harsher sanctions or other 
progressive actions to correct the behavior. 
Several courts were identified as having the most experience with Sovereign 
Citizens. The U.S. District Courts of Southern and Eastern Illinois, California, and New 
Jersey, as well as the Seventh Circuit Court represent the top five courts comprising the 
most interaction with the Sovereign rhetoric. I recommend further study into the 
procedures of these and other courts to identify best practices, poor practices, or potential 
dangers that can be grafted into procedural and programmatic changes. The best method 
of how to counter the Sovereign in the courtroom is buried in the experience held within 
the body of knowledge of the courts. If the courts goal is to counter the Sovereign’s 
damaging actions, then the best method is to identify best practices held within the 
collective knowledge of the courts.  
2. Department of Justice 
Data collection for the purposes of analysis on domestic threats requires 
improvement. Databases and research tools that act as repositories of information, such as 
Lexis, National Crime Information Center, and other technology within the community 
require updates so they can provide analysts and researchers with the means to quickly 
mine for criteria. Technological solutions are possible. The study I performed took 
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immense time, which I suspect is why the study is the first of its kind. My efforts only 
uncovered a fraction of the story. Without the tools, analysts cannot provide the tactical 
insight for law enforcement on the ground. 
The DOJ must mature domestic antiterrorism training to include Sovereign 
Citizen indicators and actions. While I appreciate the efforts of the Florida Sherriff’s 
Association, the West Memphis Police Department, and the SPLC, a training regimen 
must be developed to educate every single police officer, court room staff member, and 
the like to educate them of the potential threat they face every day. Civilian organizations 
can remain partners and should provide the external analysis, but they should not be the 
sole analysis. Training should be incorporated into the use of force scenario based 
training as well as subject interaction training. A recent publication by Wexler detailed 30 
steps to improve use of force by the police, with improving an officer’s ability to de-
escalate as one of the primary themes.137 Enhancing skills in verbal judo and additional 
exposure to the Sovereign ideology may improve the officer’s survivability and 
effectiveness during the Sovereign Citizen encounter. Simply stated the officer’s need 
exposure to the situations in training, advisement on the range of indicators and tactics, 
and information on the true scope of the problem to effectively safeguard their 
communities as well as themselves. 
3. Intelligence Community 
A common theme across the IC following September 11, 2001, was to break 
down barriers of communication and to open up the stovepipes of collection efforts. 
James Clapper identified the problem inherent to such a strategy when he said, 
“stovepipes…are often the home of the tradecraft…those agencies are responsible for 
championing the disciplines that is a very important function and one of the greatest 
strengths of the intelligence enterprise.”138 Relating Clappers comments to the initiatives 
following 9/11, the IC may be broader, yet shallower than it once was. As Zegart coined, 
                                                 
136 Chuck Wexler, Guiding Principles on Use of Force, Critical Issues in Policing Series (Washington 
D.C: Police Executive Research Forum, 2016). 
137 Clapper, "Session 1," 28:00. 
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“organization matters…the structures, cultures, and incentives of U.S. intelligence 
agencies critically influence what they do and how well they do it.”139 I have argued at 
length that the current culture within the intelligence community is one that rewards the 
analyst with thwarting an ISIS plot, but not the analyst that uncovers a systemic domestic 
threat.  
Capacity within the domestic intelligence requires bolstering. In terms of stove 
piping, the stove pipe for countering domestic non-Islamic terrorism is missing. Perhaps 
it became stale, perhaps the events following 9/11 promoted the outward focus. The 
ODNI, FBI, and DOJ must rebalance efforts, or bolster where necessary, to ensure that 
capacity exists across the spectrum of domestic intelligence. Analysts need to possess 
deep knowledge on the threat, not merely shallow knowledge about a region. Then, when 
the analysts covering a militia uprising brings a case, pay attention. When an analyst 
presents an emerging threat by ISIS in the United States, pay attention. But give both 
equal attention, without favoring the latter.  
4. Legislation 
As an overarching theme of this work, balance must be found between the 
distribution of financial and human resources to combat all of the United States’ threats. 
Presently, the legislation supporting U.S. counterterrorism efforts influences a culture 
among the responsible agencies to pursue only the foreign borne, Islamic terrorist 
activity, while ignoring the domestic cancer within. I argue that legislation reform is 
necessary in regards to the IRTPA of 2004.  
Chapter IV included details on how the IRTPA created major structural changes 
delineated between foreign, domestic, and homeland security intelligence, but it did not 
require that a balance was struck between investments and capacity within each of the 
three realms. As a result, investments in foreign intelligence and foreign counterterrorism 
launched and domestic intelligence suffered. The IRPTA must be amended to prescribe 
specific parameters for investment between foreign, domestic, and homeland security 
intelligence. 
                                                 
138 Zegart, Spying Blind. 
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B. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Sovereign Citizens threaten Americans on a daily basis, yet no organized response 
exists to counter the rising threat. Government agencies responsible for mounting a 
response are subject to influential forces that guide their narrowly focused policy. Since 
9/11, our legislation, intelligence community, and counterterrorism agencies have 
supported a system that rewards actions aimed at thwarting the foreign borne, Islamic 
terrorist organization and thereby neglecting the domestic non-Islamic threat. In the gap, 
these violent social movements have grown in membership and continue to target 
government officials, justice officials, and regular citizens. The current political 
discourse, with its adversarial culture, provides fuel for the movement. Extreme 
statements by politicians and unbelievable government shutdowns legitimize notions of a 
corrupt and fraudulent system the mind of a Sovereign.  
Police officers are on the literal front lines, and our public is endangered by the 
Sovereign ideology. Legislation must be reformed to force a balance in resources and 
personnel between foreign, domestic, and homeland security intelligence and 
counterterrorism. Courts can adjust administrative processes to filter out most of the 
Sovereign Citizens frivolous filings. The DOJ can adjust basic law enforcement training 
principles to include identifiers and use of force considerations for the Sovereigns as well 
as any social movement adherent. More and more complete information about the 
Sovereigns is, thus, indispensable to all such efforts to manage the Sovereign threat. 
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APPENDIX. SOVEREIGN ACTIVITY BY STATE AND YEAR 
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SUPPLEMENTAL 
The database of Sovereign Citizen case contents and methods are detailed in 
Chapter II, including specific information regarding each column and how the 
information was obtained. In short, the database reflects the results and findings of the 
author’s review of 548 cases spanning from April 2006 to April 2016. Quantitative 
analysis was possible for the past 10 years based on the general information extracted. 
Qualitative analysis was possible for the past five years, as further detail was extracted 
from this time period. Time constraints prohibited the same level of analysis for the entire 
10-year span. 
Those interested in obtaining the supplemental must contact the Naval 
Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library.  
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